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SECTION 1.0
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This report, "Management Approach Recommendations," has been prepared for NASA/GSFC
under contract NAS 5-20518, EOS System Definition Study. It presents the results of the
study conducted on Low Cost Management Approaches and recommends approaches which
should be applied to the EOS Program.
The GE Space Division fully concurs with NASA's increasing emphasis on improving the
cost effectiveness of space applications programs and has applied to this study the program-
matic experience of ten years of earth observation applications.
Aerospace programs historically have been high cost programs and reasonably so. With
extreme emphasis on highly reliable, redundant systems operating in a hostile environment
and more often than not pushing new technologies, the hardware has been relatively high cost.
This is not meant to imply unnecessary cost or waste. What is implied, is that highly
sophisticated products of extreme technical complexity with high reliability of operation
have been high in cost. As the aerospace industry expanded and matured, the "exotic" became
commonplace, the hostile environment was found to be not too troublesome, and complexity
and high reliability became almost routine. With these changes came concommitant cost
reductions in the product primarily engendered by reduced sophistication and more economical
methods of development, fabrication and test.
The EOS Program as configured by NASA provides an opportunity to look at the elements of
cost commonly labelled "Management," to determine if there is a better, more economical
way of doing business to further reduce the ultimate program life cost. The cost reduction
trend has been evident in the aerospace industry for several years but has been primarily
directed toward the traditional cost improvement approach. In order to dvelop a true low
cost approach, the factors which cause cost to be incurred must be identified. What are the
factors which drive up cost - the so-called cost drivers ? Before we can determine the value
and necessity of a cost, the driver for that cost must be identified and evaluated. In the
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study, the process of identifying and evaluating "cost drivers" soon indicated to the study
team that the best approach to "low cost" is good, sound business management practices by
both NASA and Industry.
As in commercial businesses, this approach has lowered costs and will reduce the cost of
aerospace products. To lower costs means to cut out the "fat, " minimize inefficiencies,
and simplify. Cutting out the "fat" will result in the elimination of longer necessary require-
ments, providing only "meet" performance not "exceeds," unless cost and "modus operandi"
are adjusted as a product matures. Minimizing inefficiencies means closely examining each
function having cost associated with it, for necessity, size and timing.
In summary, low cost demands matching all requirements to expected performance, identifying
reasonably risk for both NASA and Industry, establishing a cost, and managing to that "cost"
by both parties. Lowest cost cannot be obtained unless both parties agree that cost is the
number one driver to the final contract, in the requirements placed upon Industry, in sharing
of the risk and in maintaining an efficient simple interrelationship.
In this study, several assumptions have been made:
o "Business as usual" can be sufficiently defined to serve as a "benchmark" for showing
"lower" cost in the techniques resulting from this study.
o Reductions in NASA's "business as usual" requirements of any kind, e.g., technical
or any other can be made if a lower cost can be shown and justified as not impairing
the required performance or increasing the total program risk beyond acceptable levels.
o A defined risk can be mutually agreed upon and jointly borne by both NASA and Industry,
where experience says that the cost savings justifies the increased risk.
The key conclusions of this study are the following:
o Systems and procedural controls currently imposed on the fledgling Aerospace industry
should be relaxed on the now more mature Aerospace industry.
o Commonality can significantly reduce hardware costs by allowing a multiple buy
instead of single buy.
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SECTION 2.0
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to develop simplified management approaches which would lower
the EOS Program cost from what it would be if these approaches were not implemented, i.e.,
NASA and Industry did "business as usual."
This low cost objective is not new or radical. Government/Industry enterprises have more
often than not been the objective of cost reduction programs. What is new, is that in EOS
NASA offers a timely systematic study to low cost management that will design more simpli-
fied techniques into the basic program structure to eliminate the "cost drivers" which create
the higher cost of doing '"business as usual. " The study, therefore, was conducted so as to
produce specific recommendations for cost effective management of the Execution phase of
the EOS Program.
It must be pointed out, however, that the specific recommendations to be made in some
instances would reduce the quality or performance of the hardware but only to levels that
would be acceptable for the EOS Program.
It must be pointed out, however, that the specific recommendations to be made in some
instances would reduce the quality of performance of the hardware but only to levels that
would be acceptable for the EOS Program.
It is not an objective of this study to analyze and describe how industry can, perform internally
at a lower cost, but to identify and define Industry/NASA interfaces that would produce a lower
EOS-A Program cost than if implemented on a '"business as usual" interface. Therefore the
study is directed at the NASA/Industry interface and how that interface can be improved so
that NASA and Industry's internal implementation can, as a result, be streamlined and made
more cost effective.
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SECTION 3.0
STUDY APPROACH
The first step taken by GE in this task of the EOS study was to identify the "cost drivers"
associated with "business as usual" that might be subject to a lower cost effect based upon
history or maturity; inefficiencies that have crept in through continual use; any uniqueness,
such as modular subsystems/multiple buy, of EOS, and any unnecessary requirements.
Secondly, the study team then investigated the larger cost element of any space program to
determine methods or approaches that might still satisfy requirements but cost less.
And finally, the study team analyzed those specific management approaches that could reason-
ably be implemented by NASA and industry in time to benefit the EOS-A Program with complete
justification that neither performance nor risk would change from what NASA could expect
under "business as usual" conditions.
Because all of these opproaches are so closely tied to contractual requirements, the study
team focused on the analysis of the value of NASA management requirements in selected
areas to identify those specified requirements which could reasonably be eliminated or modi-
fied with a resultant cost decrease but without adverse impact on the EOS Program. To
establish the basic framework of the study task, an experienced team of senior GE manage-
ment personnel was assembled to identify the management areas or techniques which in their
judgement offered a good potential for cost reduction. The areas of analysis derived were:
o Program management as regards NASA/Industry interface with particular attention
to the degree of control of Industry by NASA.
o Program documentation with a decided view towards reducing the paper flow.
o Contracting techniques as regards the type of contract and the prime system contractor
concept vs. associated contractor concepts.
o Subcontracting techniques as relates to prime vs. associated contractor concepts.
o Test philosophy with emphasis on the advisability of complete part, component, sub-
system and system test.
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o Reliability and quality assurance requirement with a prime goal of elimination of
duplication of effort, such as inspectors inspecting inspectors.
In addition to the identification of the foregoing cost areas, the following innovative concepts
were recommended for investigation.
o EOS commonality potentials.
o The possible application of a "Design-to-Cost" philosophy and phased contracts.
o The possible application of appropriate commercial practices to Aerospace contracts.
o The possible contractual application of Value Management.
Each of the above areas is described in a separate section with a recommendation for or against
implementaion on. EOS and where possible a best estimate of possible cost savings over
"business as usual."
3-2
SECTION 4.0
STUDY TASKS
4.1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
This portion of the study effort was concerned solely with interaction between NASA and
industry in the areas of generalized program management and control, and data management.
The question was asked, "How best and most economically can NASA maintain the required
control of industry while maintaining the orderly progression of effort?"
The NASA/Industry organization to provide overall management of the EOS Program consists
of the necessary personnel to provide top-level program direction, planning and control; cost
and schedule control; contract and subcontract administration and general administration.
This cost has throughout the past years been deeply scrutinized and depressed to between 7
and 12% of the total program cost. The 5% spread is generally attributable to the type of
program with a sequentially scheduled "off-the-shelf" program at the low end and a concurrent
development/production program of "off-the-shelf" technology at the high end.
Commercial product businesses do not normally incur a program management cost of this
magnitude. It is generally conceded that it costs less to run a commercial products business
than it does to run a business whose products are sold to the Government because mangement
has more freedom to take risks in commercial business.
This is both caused and explained by several factors. In the space business the product must
work the first time; therefore, quality of the product is the number one cost driver while for
a commercial product a warranty reserve is frequently established so that if the product
breaks down it can be brought back for repair or replacement, consequently cost is the number
one driver. The space product is a highly complex product and there are few products sold
commercially which approach the complexity of space hardware. In addition, the aerospace
business, along with all other businesses that sell to the government particularly on a cost-
plus basis are subject to regulation and audit by the government whereas in a commercial
business audits are conducted by company or company hired personnel. This ultimate
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responsibility to the taxpayer has caused the need for large complex data banks or filing
systems not generally required in industrial or consumer product business. The follow-on
market for spacecraft is usually very small when compared to commercial businesses,
thereby requiring what are usually non-recurring costs to be written off against the one or
two items produced. The small number of parts required limits the number of items which
can be sold later. As a result there is no benefit of learning curves or volume production
from which commercial products benefit. This list of criteria are summarized in Table
4-1.
The remainder of this section of the report will categorize cost control techniques used in
commercial businesses for consideration on the )OS program. The categories to be des-
cribed include:
o Operations within NASA
o NASA interfaces with the contractor
Table 4-1. Differences Between Commercial and Aerospace Business
Aerospace Commercial
1. Performance is #1 price driver - Cost (profit) is #1 driver
cost is #2
2. Complex - highly technical product Generally less technical, less complex
3. Highly regulated (ASPR's) Minimum regulation
4. Limited quantity - highly customized Medium to high production
5. Dual risk - Government and industry Single risk - industry
6. Return on investment small for High return on'investment
industry
7. Follow-on market small Follow-on market may be large (spares,
maintenance, repair)
8. Must work the first and only time If it doesn't work - bring it back
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o Operation of the program by the contractor
o Contractor interface with subcontractor
In each of these areas, ideas for cost control will be described and evaluated in terms of
'"payoff potential" and "risk. Since the EOS program is a large, complex spacecraft program,
the Aircraft Engine Division (AED) and the General Electric Locomotive Products Department
(LPD), both of which produce large complex products, were selected as a basis for study and
comparison.
4.1.1 OPERATIONS WITHIN NASA
After considering the management techniques used in AED and LPD as typical well-managed
commercial organizations, several techniques emerge for potential use by NASA management
during the life of the EOS program, including:
o Operating the program with tasks in series rather than in parallel.
o Development of a standard product (General Purpose Spacecraft) and production of
many of that product.
o Minimize design refinement and correct mistakes at assembly or test where labor
is cheaper.
o Increase use of lower cost personnel.
o Charge other organizatio ns for doing work to accomplish their objectives.
Operate as a "Series" Program. In AED and LPD and in almost all well-run industrial
organizations where a major concern is that the amount of money available for investment
is limited, management conducts projects with steps toward completion in series rather
than in parallel. This avoids having portions of the work being done more than one time
because of inadequate definition or because of making decisions with incomplete information.
This technique permits incremental funding of elements of the program which in turn enables
management to evaluate ideas, results, personnel and organizations on the basis of work
completed. Adjustments can then be made to market conditions (congressional to executive
pressures), or changes in goals. The major disadvantage is that the program will run for a
longer period of time, which in itself tends to increase cost, but results in less total expense.
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Development of a Standard Product. An approach used successfully by industrial
organizations to control costs is to standardize the product. This provides benefits in
personnel becoming more efficient at their tasks during the life of the production run
(learning curves), benefits to purchasing because quantity purchases often enable the
buyer to obtain price breaks and increases the quality of later products by permitting time
for problem solving on earlier products. Another advantage which NASA would gain is
that cost increases resulting from inflationary pressures can be avoided by producing
many of the standard products early. If necessary, modification kits can be prepared to
add or subtract power, attitude control gas or other required element.
Push Costs Downstream. An operating philosophy in many successful commercial
organizations is to minimize the design refinement activity and to solve design problems
as close to shipment as possible. This tends to reduce costs by minimizing the need for
the higher priced professional and semi-professional technical labor. An organization
can use a great number of hours designing for worst case situations, making drawings in
great detail, planning for all conceivable situations and too often most of the worst cases
will not occur. The operating philosophy in commercial activities is to design and plan
for the nominal situations and if something turns up as a problem in either manufacturing
or test, solve the problem at that time.
Increase Use of Lower Skilled Personnel. By breaking tasks into finite pieces and by
means of specialization, it is possible to make effective use of lower skilled personnel.
Commercial businesses use this technique extensively. The benefits that accrue are that
personnel are well trained, very experienced, relatively low cost, yet effective. They are
relatively inflexible and usually will not step out of their specific area of responsibility.
This, of course, puts more pressure on management when problems occur or when there
are grey areas of responsibility between personnel.
These and other potentially adaptable techniques, their possible risks and payoffs are
listed in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2. Techniques Used by Commercial Businesses
Internally Which Could Be Considered For Use At NASA
Technique Possible Potential Risk Potential Payoff Remarks
Operate program on Lengthen program which Less work being done over. Highly recommended.
series basis. could add to cost.
Purchase bus in high Obsolescence of bus or Less expensive. Purchase 5 to 10 spacecraft
quantity. extensive modifications. Permit learning curve new.
to be effective,
improve quality.
Push costs downstream Lengthen time to solve Fewer technical people Very effective techniques
problems. required, fewer in commercial business.
draftsmen and techni-
cians.
Increase use of Increases pressure on Lower cost to program. In GE Locomotive Department
lower level personnel. management, can lead to 200, 000, 000 $/yr. business
mistakes because of has only 350-400 exempt
lack of experience. employees. Complex product
Not as much growth or much design effort.
movement of employees.
Limited flexibility of
people.
Charge back to other Conflict between Lower cost for NASA. Obtain quote from contractor
agencies for meeting agencies and GAO. for each clause which requires
their goals, e.g., additional effort.
charge small business
for administration
effort.
Eliminate represen- Loss of management Reduce overhead expenses, Locomotive Dept. at GE buys
tatives living at (NASA) visibility. number of personnel 100, 000, 000 $/yr. of supplier
contractor. 
. office expenses, travel. equipment - have no expediters
living at any supplier plant.
Minimize formal Depends on ability of More time for management Could also increase the
planning for management to recover to work in technical length of the program.
contingencies. when in trouble. areas. Less time required
for administration of
clerical personnel.
4.1.2 NASA INTERFACE WITH CONTRACTOR
All organizations can work to reduce costs internally with some degree of success, but
to many organizations, where purchased material or services is a large part of cost it is
also important to review procedures and methods used in dealing with suppliers. This
section of the report deals with the relationship between commercial businesses and their
suppliers to compare the methods they use with those normally used by NASA with their
suppliers.
Some of the techniques used by commercial organizations to keep costs low on subcontracted
or purchased items include:
o Detailed product development planning reduces costly change of scope and
objectives
o Minimum trips, few expediters, no personnel living at supplier plant
o Minimum number of terms and conditions in contract
o Contract is usually written for total program
o Commercial organizations do not attempt to specify supplier internal
procedures
o Do not use military or Government specifications
o Negotiate options for additional equipment
o Lease rather than purchase equipment
The risks and payoffs associated with the above ideas, and a few others, are listed
in Table 4-3.
4. 1.2.1 Reliance on Supplier Technical Expertise
Large commercial organizations rarely design a complex element of their final product.
They usually find it more inexpensive to depend on the specialty companies where the
technical expertise is available rather than hire those people for their own organization.
If supplier companies are sufficiently competent in their fields so that there are few
unknown situations, they generally prefer fixed price contracts. In addition, their
expertise minimizes delivery delay risks. Commercial organizations do, however,
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Table 4-3. Techniques Used By Commercial Business With
Their Suppliers Which Can Be Considered By NASA
TECHNIQUES POSSIBLE POTENTIAL RISK POTENTIAL PAYOFF REMARKS
Increase reliance on Schedule risk if problems Less NASA internal cost. Must select capable, tech-
technical expertise of develop which require NASA nically honest supplier.
contractor, help.
Eliminate representa- Loss of management visi- Reduce overhead, expenses A commercial department
tives living at suppliers. bility. of technical personnel, within GE buying 100, 000, 000
office expenses and travel. $/year of supplier equipment.
Has no expediters living at
any supplier plant.
Reduce number and extent Could have problems with Lower overhead, less Requires special approvals
of contract terms and GAO. May conflict with people, within government.
conditions. goals of other agencies.
Eliminate limitation of Problem obtaining funding. Lower administrative cost, Depends on budget authority.
NASA obligation by less people, less record
period; contract or keeping.
entire program.
Do not specify Loss of element of control Lower cost, supplier can Easily applied, minimum
contractor internal and knowledge by NASA. use his own routine pro- risk.
procedures. cedures. Reduce OH and
special costs.
Eliminate use of Could cost more to prepare Use commercial specs, More pressure on knowledge-
program, Mil-specs. new specs. lower OH, less certifi- able spacecraft management
cations. people.
Negotiate options for Cost of the option. Lower end item cost for Could be impossible to
additional equipment. future equipment, negotiate because of
inflation.
Lease rather than Conflict with other Permit contractor to gain Could be effective depending
purchase equipment, programs is possible. investment tax credit, to on supplier's willingness
amortize equipment and to accommodate and availa-
gain income tax benefit bility of investment funds.
which can be passed on to
NASA.
Make no claim for Loss of future benefit. Subcontractor can gain Will require special
subcontract patent or benefit and may be willing approval within government.
copyright rights. to reduce cost by taking
risk.
Increases use of Cost to determine where Reduced cost. By reviewing army, AF, etc.
Government equipment, equipment exists may not available surplus and unused
be recoverable. equipment lists.
Increase reliance on Historical records not Fewer technical personnel, Could file vugraphs, charts,
oral reports, less on available if something typists, clerical and rough notes and the like.
written. goes wrong. overhead people at both Could use bound notebooks.
supplier and NASA.
Build more design mar- More reliance on design. Lessen analysis and test. Must use judicious cost.
gin and do less trades.
sophisticated analysis
and test.
Increase willingness to More reliance on testing Fewer analyses, less Must use judiciously - it
take risks; e.g., less and repairs, technical personnel may be cheaper to analyze
analysis (reliable) and not test.
Use fixed price contract Less information available. Lower cost. Should minimize NASA
for spacecraft after controls after development
development. work complete.
Merge NASA personnel Objectives of workers can Needs strong management Has been used by commercial
with contractor personnel. be muddled, to make it work. organizations; "TACRV project
for DOT" as an example.
Purchase a mockup to Cost of mockup and useful- Permits easy checking of Used in aircraft development
evaluate changes. ness could be questioned. configuration changes extensively.
later in the program.
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utilize value engineering techniques to reduce the cost of the product once the design is
underway. This technique, along with "design-to-cost" are extremely effective in the
control of costs.
4. 1.2.2 Trips, Expediters and Company Representatives
The Locomotive Products Department's sales are on the order of $200, 000, 000 per year,
purchases to support these sales run about $ 100, 000, 000. Yet LPD uses very few
expediters, permits very few trips for purposes of expediting and has no company
representatives living at any supplier's plant. The Locomotive Products Department has
only six expediters all of whom are non-exempt personnel. Almost all contacts are made
by telephone. In fact, the travel budget for the entire purchasing unit in 1973 was on the
order of $6-10, 000. If this approach were adopted by NASA, a major risk would be the
loss of management visibility.
4. 1.2.3 Minimum Number of Terms and Conditions
Commercial organizations prepare contracts with a minimum of terms and conditions
which tend to keep costs low. Comparing terms and conditions used commercially with
those used in Government contracts indicates that several of the NASA standard terms and
conditions have no parallel in commercial subcontracting.
There are many clauses recommended by the NASA Procurement Regulation Handbook for
use in contracting usually not used in commercial applications, which tend to add cost -
ref. Table 4-4. These are only representative samples. In place of these clauses,
rules of law based on the "Commercial Code" are usually considered sufficient.
A question which must be answered is, "Is it possible to write a contract between the
Government and a supplier without using the clauses above, either in part or totally "
It is believed that it is possible to reduce the optional clauses without increasing any risk
to NASA.
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Table 4-4. Examples of Non-Mandatory Clauses Used by NASA as Standard Operating Procedures
Clause
No. Synopsis Effect
7.103-2 Changes
The contracting officer may make changes to Contractor must be extremely alert to
drawings, design, specs, method of packing technical changes. In a large organiza-
or shipment and place of delivery. If change tion where the government has people in
causes increase or decrease in cost, time, residence, with people constantly in
or performance, an equitable adjustment contact and where contractor trains people
shall be made in price, delivery or both, to react favorably to customer personnel,
Claims by contractor must be asserted within it is difficult for management to learn of
30 days (may be changed to "not to exceed cost adding changes. Therefore, contingency
60 days"). Failure to agree invokes "dispute" fund must be larger.
clause.
7.103-3 Extras
No payment for extras unless authorized in May cause conflicts between technical
writing by the contracting officer. personnel if contractor personnel refuse
changes.
7. 103-5 Inspection
Supplies or lots which have been rejected or The right of a unilaterial decision has the
require to be corrected shall be removed tendency of adding risk for the contractor
or, if permitted or REQUIRED by the con- (which would rarely be accepted by a
tracting officer, corrected in place by and commercial organization) forcing him to
at the expense of the contractor ... add contingent costs. For example, the
contractor may find it cheaper to repair
the items in his own plant.
7. 104.20(a) Utilization of Concerns in Labor Surplus Area
7.203.26 Contractor is required to consider labor Additional solicitation for proposals, addi-
7. 302.26 surplus area subcontractor for award of tional evaluation, record keeping, clerical
7.402.27 subcontract over $500,000. increases, etc. Notify the subcontracting
7.702.35 office of names of subcontractors.
7.703.27
4. 1.2. 4 Supplier Internal Procedures
The main interest of a commercial organization with his supplier is that the supplier provide
a high quality part on schedule. It sometimes appears that a government agency is more
interested in having the supplier follow a system rather than produce good hardware.
Although the magnitude of this problem has been reduced in the past few years, there are
still some vestiges of it remaining and when it exists, it adds to the cost of the program.
4. 1. 2. 5 Use of Government and Military Specs
Government and Military Specifications have always had excellent details and are well
written. The problem for commercial organizations is that they permit no cost saving
shortcuts or time saving methods. They are very much oriented, as they should be, to
getting an excellent product. As a result, the costs are high, and as a further result the
price is high. Government Specifications should be carefully reviewed jointly by NASA and
the system contractor to ascertain whether each "requirement" is really necessary for each
particular program.
4. 1.2.6 Options
When a commercial business makes purchases they often negotiate an option clause which
obligates the supplier to produce an additional number of units for a fixed amount of money
within a fixed time frame. This type of option may add to the original cost but the tradeoff
can be evaluated when the parameters are known.
4. 1.2.7 Lease Rather Than Purchase
Both commercial businesses and homeowners frequently find it cheaper to lease a piece of
equipment rather than purchase it outright. This saves the costs of ownership, interest and
maintenance. Most lease arrangements have a purchase break-even point dependent upon
period of use. Whenever possible, lease versus purchase should be investigated.
Other organizations within NASA may have some usable equipment. NASA's G. C. Marshall
Space Flight Center published in April of 72 a catalog of "ATM Ground Support Equipment"
which was available as late as early 1974.
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4.1.3 CONTRACTOR PROGRAM OPERATIONS
The amount of control NASA imposes on the contractor's operation poses a dilemma for
NASA. If NASA imposes its desired operating approach on the supplier, it is possible
that additional costs will result. On the other hand, if NASA adopts a "hands-off" attitude
with respect to operating procedures they will be concerned whether the project is being
completed in a high quality-expeditious manner. The best protection, of course, is to
contract with a company which has a good reputation and applicable experience. There are
many techniques which NASA can influence the contractor to use to minimize costs;
including those indicated in Table 4-5. Most of these are used by commercial organiza-
tions within GE with some degree of success. Some of these will be similar or identical
to the techniques shown in Tables 4-2 and 4-5.
The contractor can help reduce program costs by utilizing some of the following techniques:
o Use a program "war" room and hold daily meetings
o Use "Tiger" teams to attack high cost items
o Increase use of lower level personnel
o Push costs downstream by reducing number of technical personnel, checkers,
and planners
o Push costs downstream by reducing component testing
o Increase search for subcontractors
4. 1.3. 1 Use of a Program "War" Room
A program "war" room is a room set aside for the mounting of chart-size schedules and
action items. Responsible program personnel are required to keep the mounted schecules
current. E is used by the program manager and his staff who conduct daily meetings in
the room with responsible technical personnel. Each day one or more of these people are
required to make a presentation on the status of their effort. As the presentation is made
the program manager and his staff develop questions and action items which require
response by appropriate program personnel. The use of such a room reduces costs by
reducing the need for written communications along with the attendant typing and clerical
functions, reduces the possibility that required work will "slip-through-the-cracks" and not
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Table 4-5. Techniques Used by Commercial Departments within GE to Control Costs
IDEA POTENTIAL RISK POTENTIAL SAVING REMARKS
Use of schedule "War Time expended in meetings. Management visibility and * Needs strong experience
Room" and daily meetings control without formal and management.
reporting. * Accomplished only at
highest levels in commer-
cial work.
Special management Management may concen- Management visibility Should include financial
"topic" review meetings trate on technical aspects into problems. reporting as in commercial
rather than cost. business. Engineers
should be responsible for
costs.
Use "Tiger" team to Additional effort may be Value engineering approach Requires discipline. LPD
reduce costs, required to assure that to cost cutting. (Locomotive Products) used
quality is not "cost this approach for 21 mil-
reduced" out. lion in savings on
$200, 000, 000 sales in 1973.
Increase use of lower Increase pressure on Lower cost. * Reduces people flexibility
level personnel, management. * Less upward mobility or
sideways movement by
employees
* Restricts growth.
Push costs downstream, Problems will show up in Less personnel on program. * Tradeoff is - "Is it
reduce number of checkers assembly. Design and Planning per- cheaper to find problem
and planners. sonnel are more expensive before assembly or fix
than shop people. at assembly?"
* Most commercial organiza-
tions work to reduce
upstream cost.
Push costs downstream, Problem will show up in Less personnel on program. * Tradeoff is - "Is it
reduce component testing. system test. cheaper to find problem
before assembly or
fix at assembly?"
* Most commercial organiza-
tions work to reduce
upstream cost.
Increase search for May increase costs if Reduced cost through added Commercial business goes
subcontractors. difficult to find. competition. far and wide to obtain
competitive sources includ-
ing foreign suppliers.
be completed, assures management attention, raises morale of the program personnel by
assuring that their work has management attention and improves communication.
4. 1.3.2 "TiAer" Team
Occasionally, a particularly difficult problem will be brought to management's attention
which continues in a persistent manner to refuse to be solved. At times like this it is
frequently useful to assign a group of specialists to solve the problem. The problem can
either be technical or financial. The use of "tiger" teams relates back to the discussion
of "Value Management" discussed in Section 4.9 of this report. The decision on using such
an approach would be the responsibility of the program manager. The advantages would be
to bring the best people to bear on problem solving in order to prevent a problem from
holding up the entire program.
4. 1.3. 3 Increase Use of Lower Level Personnel
This discussion was covered in paragraph 4. 1. 1 of this report. As it applies to NASA it
also applies to industry. In addition to those comments made in the earlier paragraph, it
should be realized that a major difference in commercial business from the space business
is the utilization of personnel. In a commercial business the ratio of non-exempt (lower
level) people to exempt people is much higher. This requires that management be more
specific in task definition because the lower level people, though usually extremely
competent in a narrow job, cannot handle broad responsibilities. These people are usually
much less flexible, much less likely to want upward mobility and are far more satisfied
with routine.
4. 1.3.4 Reduce Component Testing
Careful evaluation and tradeoff between component and subsystem versus system testing
should be considered. Here again, by pushing as much of the cost downstream the total
cost should tend to be lower. It is possible to design and test for all potentialities but to
do so becomes an expensive exercise since most of the contingent situations will never
happen. If they do not occur, the design and planning or component test effort is wasted.
If problems occur they can be solved at that time so that no manpower is wasted. If the
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system test can be designed to exercise the component appropriately it should be possible
to eliminate or minimize the component test.
4. 1.3. 5 Increase Search for Subcontractors
If the problem is faced properly, it should be possible for Purchasing to obtain more
potential sources for commodities. By so doing, competition can be increased and
Purchasing will then have better leverage to obtain lower prices.
4.1.4 CONTRACTOR INTERFACE WITH SUBCONTRACTOR
In a large project, an important part of the cost of doing business is usually associated with
purchasing materials or services. Management, therefore, should be concerned with
techniques, methods or systems which have the effect of reducing the cost of subcontracts.
Since material and labor costs are fairly well established once a subcontractor understands
what he is to produce, negotiation brings only limited reductions. Therefore, it is often
fruitful to review operating procedures, communications techniques, reports, data
requirements, certifications and other peripheral costs in order to be "cost effective".
Some techniques used by commercial businesses in managing subcontractors are:
o Use of fixed price contracts
o Increased reliance on oral reports, less on written
o Elimination or marked reduction of trips to supplier plants
o Increase quantity purchases early in program
o Avoiding the specification of subcontractor internal procedures
o Negotiating options for additional equipment
o Purchase of parts and holding in supplies inventory without assembling
until required
o Contractor purchase of special equipment
o Obtaining discounts for early payment
The potential payoff and risks for each of these ideas is summarized in Table 4-6.
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Table 4-6. Techniques Used by Commercial Organizations to Manage Subcontractors
ITEM POTENTIAL RISK POTENTIAL BENEFITS REMARKS
Use of fixed price If financial problem Known cost. Must expect to pay higher
contract. occurs supplier may fee from DOD report "Profit
badly slip schedule. Rates on Negotiated Prime
In commercial business Contracts", 1964-1973
0 0 cost breakdown isn't FFP 11.1% profit
determinable when fixed EPI 10.1%
price contract is used. CPIF 7.7%
CPFF 6.3%
Increase reliance on Problems may be hidden Less cost - less overhead Can use telephone for obtain-
oral reports, less on until too late to save and direct personnel, ing information.
written. schedule. Request oral reports at
supplier plant
Eliminate or markedly Reduced management Reduce travel and living Use telephone for informa-
reduce trips to visibility. expenses. tion.
supplier plant. Use expediters.
Increase quantity Obsolescense because of Save on price breaks, Quantities may be too low to
purchase early in design change. inflationary pressures, gain benefit but this tech-
program. Cost of carrying inven- nique is used extensively
tory may be high. by commercial organizations
placing material in inventory.
Do not specify Loss of management Lower cost of OH. On fixed price particularly
subcontractors visibility. risk is subcontractors.
internal procedures
Negotiate options May not be possible Assure spot in schedule Quantities may be too low.
for additional equipment because of inflationary and try to stabilize
pressure. price.
Purchase parts and Obsolescence and cost of Assured availability of Used on occasion by commer-
have supplier hold in carrying inventory, parts with no inflationary cial organizations - particu-
inventory without adders other than labor larly to protect against potential
assembling until of assembly. labor strikes.
required.
Contractor purchase May be more costly depen- Contractor gains invest- On occasion a commercial
special equipment ding on who (contractor/ ment tax credit and organization will purchase
and lease to sub. sub) is more capable income tax benefit. equipment and lease it to
financially. sub.
Obtain discounts for Depends on interest rates Discounted invoice can Only useful if subcontractor
early payment. and which company can save up to 1%/month at has receivable problem.
make better use of money,. the present time.
4. 1. 4. 1 Use of Fixed Price Contracts
Of great importance is the type of subcontract. In a fixed price subcontract, for example,
where the risk is greatest, the subcontractor usually quotes the highest profit because of
his need for a contingency fund; in a cost plus contract on the hand, the contractor is usually
satisfied with much lower fees. The commercial businesses use fixed price contracting
almost exclusively. In fairness, however, it must be stated that the magnitude of risk is
usually considerably less than that which would put the company in financial jeopardy while
that is sometimes not the case with the smaller space hardware suppliers.
Fixed price contracts can be used most effectively when the design and production variables
are known and when there is little concern over need for changes. if the program has the
benefit of permitting fixing all or most requirements early, the fixed price subcontract
would be most attractive.
4.1.4.2 Increased Reliance on Oral Reports
Written reports require typing, numbering, filing and maintenance of files. Cost control
requires the prevention of adding personnel to the payroll. The subcontractor will have
sufficient personnel available to accomplish some level of effort to prepare formal, written
reports. Beyond that "given" level it will be necessary to add personnel. The contractor
should make the effort to determine whether his requirements for formal reports forces
the subcontractor to add personnel. If it does, the contractor could scale his requests down
to eliminate the additional cost.
4. 1.4. 3 Trips to Supplier Plants
Trips to suppliers are expensive. For example, a two-day trip for one man from
Philadelphia to Los Angeles would cost over four hundred dollars. It is easy to understand
how a significant number of dollars can be saved by not making trips. In order to
accomplish this, it may be necessary to raise the level of approval required to authorize
trips. In addition, it will put additional pressure on telephone and other communication
methods.
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4. 1.4.4 Increase Quantity Purchases Early
If the contract with NASA is for a sufficient number of general purpose spacecraft, an
attempt should be made to maximize the number of components purchased from a single
supplier. By this method it should be possible to interest additional suppliers in bidding
for the work and to obtain price breaks for volume purchases. Purchases made early in
the program will most likely be less expensive than if made later because increases due to
inflation will be avoided. The main risk will be that the equipment purchased might not be
usable later because of engineering changes. Also the cost of carrying the material in
inventory, usually considered 20 - 30% of the value of the material, must be traded off
against the potential saving.
4. 1.4. 5 Subcontractor Internal Procedures
The tendency for a contractor is to specify routines which work in his organization, for
use by the subcontractor. Unfortunately, those procedures which work in one organization
will not necessarily work in another. In addition it may be necessary to superimpose the
new system on top of one already in existence which does nothing more than add cost.
Although this practice is tending to be overcome with recent programs, there still remain
some vestiges of the practice. In order to guard against the practice, all procedural
specifications or requirements should be reviewed to question the necessity for their
inclusion.
4. 1.4. 6 Negotiate Options for Additional Equipment
During the original negotiations, it may be possible for the contractor to obtain an option
clause which would have the effect of binding the supplier to providing additional units at
the same or only slightly increased cost. This kind of option will not, of course, be
obtained without some cost to the contractor. Therefore, once again there is a tradeoff
to be made. That is, the cost of the option against the potential saving.
4. 1.4.7 Purchase Inventory to be Held Unassembled by the Supplier
In order to obtain the benefits of having additional parts, as protection against failures or
as additional components for later spacecraft, without paying for the entire component,
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the contractor could buy elements and have the subcontractor store them. For example,
if a particular component requires resistors, switches,, relays, etc. which must be
assembled into a black box, the contractor could have the subcontractor purchase all the
elements and have them held in bonded stock until required without making the assembly.
These elements will then be from the same lot of material so that requalification will not be
necessary (depending on shelf life) and the contractor will not have to pay for assembly and
test through G&A and profit. He will also gain the benefit of reduced schedule to complete
the item should he decide later to complete the product.
4. 1.4. 8 Contractor Purchase Special Equipment
In order to minimize the cost to the program, and depending on which company has the
most available funds and which has the greatest tax benefits resulting from such acquisition
it may be better for the contractor to purchase special equipment for lease or loan to the
subcontractor rather than have the subcontractor make the purchase.
4. 1.4.9 Discounts for Early Payment
One technique used extensively by commercial businesses is the use of discounts to obtain
early payment. It is to the benefit of the supplier to obtain cash quickly in order that he
avoid borrowing at high interest rates. Therefore, discounts of 1% for payment within 30
days of tendering the invoice is quite common. Effort should be made to extend this
practice which is not universal in the aerospace industry.
4.1.5 SUMMARY
The preceding sections contain many possible changes in management techniques and
methods, all of which individually and collectively say that more reliance can now be
placed on the capability of the Aerospace industry and, therefore, the tight contractor
control that has developed over the past years can, in fact, be somewhat relaxed. Although
it is not possible to quantize cost savings, intuitively it is apparent that some savings in
program management costs will result if industry is provided less regimentation and
adherence to rigid check and balance systems of control which prescribe how the industrial
contractor shall perform but add little value to the products.
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4.2 COMMONALITY POTENTIALS
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION
A basic objective of the EOS Study is to provide a design for a General Purpose spacecraft
with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the EOS-A mission requirements as well as a
number of follow-on mission payloads. The general approach, therefore, during the study
was to establish the driving requirements for each subsystem and to provide a design for
those subsystems which could indeed allow them to be utilized for various missions. Each
subsystem was investigated in this regard and the results of each cost/design tradeoff is
presented in individual sections of Volume 3 of the study, "Design/Cost Tradeoff Studies".
The cost saving measurements for commonality are quantified in each individual technical
tradeoff study with a resultant selection of the best commonality approach. This section will
summarize the overall results of these individual studies in terms of providing a listing of
some of the common hardware items and the number of units that would afford the best
"low cost" make/buy approach predicted upon the mission model that was used for the study.
4.2.2 HARDWARE SELECTIONS FOR COMMONALITY
The following table presents on a "subsystem" level, the elements of the General Purpose
spacecraft to which the commonality approach is readily applicable. The hardware has been
chosen/designed to provide maximum flexibility for presently contemplated future applications.
The subsystem modules have been designed to provide capability for launch on a Delta 2910
with growth capability (using identical hardware at the component level) for launch on the
Titan IIIB, and subsequently, the Shuttle.
Although this table represents only the General Purpose Spacecraft in terms of commonality
buys, the same approach could be considered in the ground station area, especially the low
cost ground stations. The Antenna, Receiving, Recording, Processing and Display Subsystems
could be purchased as a multiple buy with attendant cost savings.
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Common Hardware Differences - General Purpose Spacecraft
Subsystem Delta 2910 Titan IIIB Shuttle
ACS Module Same Same Same
Power Module 2 Batteries 3 Batteries 3 Batteries
77 ft 2 Solar Array 109 ft 2 Solar Array 109 ft2 Solar Array
C&DH Module 1 OBC 2 OBC 2 OBC
Structure Modified Transition Ring Transition Ring Transition Ring
Thermal Control Similar Same Same
Electrical Dist. Similar Same Same
4.2.3 MISSION MODEL
The mission model used in the study is presented below:
MISSION MODEL
77 78 79 80 81 82
3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1IQ 2Q 3Q 4Q
EOS-AEOS-A Launch
EOS-Bch
EOS-C Launch
SEOS Launch
SOLAR MAX. LaunchLaunch
A Launch B Launch
OPERS
2 Spacecraft
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TOTAL NO.
QTY PER S/C REQUIRED SHELF LIFE
ACS MODULE
BACKUP CONTROLLER 1 5 " >5 YEARS
MAG. COMPENSATOR 3 15 >5 YEARS
MAG. CONTROL 1 5 >5 YEARS
MOMENTUM WHEEL 3 15 >10 YEARS
ELECTRONICS, WHEEL 1 5 >10YEARS
STAR TRACKER 1 5 >10 YEARS
IRU PLATFORM 1 5 >10 YEARS
SOLAR ASPECT SENSORS 6 30 > 10 YEARS
MAGNETOMETER 1 5 >5 YEARS
POWER MODULE
CENTRAL CONTROL UNIT 1 5 >5 YEARS
POWER REGULATION UNIT 2 10 >5 YEARS
POWER CONTROL UNIT 1 5 >5 YEARS
BATTERY 2 10 >10 YEARS UNCHARGED
REMOTE DECODER 2 10 >5 YEARS
REMOTE MUX 2 10 >5 YEARS
S/C INTERFACE ASSY 1 5 >10 YEARS
TEST CONNECTOR ASSY 1 5 >10 YEARS
SOLAR ARRAY 1 5 >10 YEARS
C&DH MODULE
S-BAND TRANSPONDER 1 5 >5 YEARS
MOD SWITCHING 1 5 >5 YEARS
CNTRL. DEMODULATOR 1 5 >5 YEARS
FORMAT GENERATOR 1 5 >5 YEARS
CLOCK - UNIT 1 5 >5 YEARS
REMOTE TELEMETRY 1 5 >5 YEARS
REMOTE COMMAND 1 5 >5 YEARS
S-BAND ANTENNA 1 5 >10 YEARS
PROCESSOR 1 5 >5 YEARS
MEMORY - CMP 1 5 >5 YEARS
POWER CONV. - CMP 1 5 >5 YEARS
SPECIAL IO - CMP 1 5 >5 YEARS
STRUCTURE
STRUA ACS MOD 1 5 >10 YEARS
STRU. POWER MOD 1 5 >10 YEARS
STRU. C&DH MOD 1 5 >10 YEARS
STRU. BASIC S/C 1 5 >10 YEARS
THERMAL CONTROL
BLANKETS INS. 1 5 >10 YEARS
THERMAL COATING 1 5 >10 YEARS
HEATERS 1 5 >10 YEARS
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION
WIRE ACS S/S 1 5 >10 YEARS
WIRE POWER S/S 1 5 >10 YEARS
SIGNAL CONDITIONING 1 5 >10 YEARS
WIRE SPACECRAFT 1 5 >10 YEARS
WIRE C&DH S/S. 1 5 >10 YEARS
Figure 4-1. General Purpose Spacecraft Components Required
To Support 5 Missions (Delta 2910)
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It would appear advisable to purchase or manufacture five sets of flight hardware to
benefit from the cost savings of a multiple purchase. The General Purpose Spacecraft
as presently conceived could support the first missions shown on the model; Seasat A,
Solar Maximum, EOS-A, Seasat B, and EOS-B mission. The number of components
involved in this multiple buy are shown in Figure 4-1. The subsystems are indicated
as well as the major components required and the capability of these components to
support the first five missions.
4.2.4 SHELF LIFE
Shelf life of the hardware as shown in the table indicates that hardware manufactured in
1975 could be considered to be reliable for a 1980 launch and a two-year orbit life,
providing that certain storage conditions and exercise of selected components is con-
ducted on a regularly scheduled basis. Studies conducted on other programs indicate
that if the spacecraft is stored in a clean, dry (60% RH or less) non-magnetic and non-UV
environment that there should be no storage problems. Some components require special
storage techniques such as:
o Batteries should be enclosed in plastic bags and packed with dessicant
bags. After packaging, modules are to be stored at a temperature of
5 ±50 (41 +90 F) in a refrigerator or freezer. Periodic testing should
be conducted.
o C and DH components should be stored in an environment in which the
magnetic field is less than 50 gauss. Periodic tests should be conducted.
o ACS gyros must be stored with the spin axis horizontal. Many oils and
greases will tend to creep in stationary bearings. Provision should be
made for periodic exercise of such bearings.
o Other aspects of storage that must be considered are such items as cold flow
or permanent deformation of rubber, elastomeric or plastic materials under
mechanical stress, oxidation or ozonation, and UV light discoloration of
coatings. However with proper procedures and replacement of specific parts,
shelf life of hardware can be increased considerably.
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4.2.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, the recommended approach to low cost hardware commonality on the EOS
Program consists of the following:
o Multiple buys of hardware with a minimum purchase of sets for at least five
spacecraft.
o Design of the General Purpose spacecraft to use the same hardware to perform
multi-mission requirements.
o Since shelf life of 5 years for spacecraft hardware does not appear to be a
problem based upon previous studies conducted, that certain storage environments
be provided, and that selected components be exercised and retrofitted as required.
4.3 CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the areas of analysis recommended by NASA and concurred with by the GE
Management Review Team was contracting techniques between NASA and Industry. This
subject has been the object of much attention by both Government and Industry agencies
in the past. A review of available data indicates that a case for or against any contracting
technique can be made dependent upon the particular set of cost incurring circumstances
and the objective the the analyst. For these reasons the EOS Study Team analyzed
contracting techniques with a view towards recommending a contracting technique which
would facilitate the interface between NASA and Industry and which would allow NASA to
relax its control of the contractors without fear of obtaining a less capable product. This
lessening of control and easing of interface should tend to reduce costs.
The results of this analysis indicate that the most effective techniques for the EOS Program
would include:
o Multiple contractors - spacecraft system and instruments
o A two-phase contract which separates development and production
o Application of "Design-to-Cost" techniques (See Para. 4. 8)
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o Providing the same contracting basis for all contractors
o A combination of incentive and award fees with successive targets
o Inclusion of Value Management provisions (See Para. 4.9)
To be cost effective, any contract requires an equally aggressive program of participation
and support on the part of both NASA and the contractor. The type of contract recommended
creates this environment wherein both parties are working toward the same objective of
a low cost program.
4.3.2 METHOD OF CONTRACTING
In the analysis of the method of contracting, three basic methods of contracting were
considered: a single prime system contractor, multiple prime contractors for system
elements, and prime and associate contractors.
METHOD 1 - Single Prime System Contractor
In this method NASA would contract with a single contractor for the spacecraft, the
instruments, and the ground data handling system as depicted in Figure 4-2.
NASA
PRIME SYSTEM CONTRACTOR
S/C GDHS INSTRUMENTS
Figure 4-2
This method is a very attractive one since NASA has a single point of responsibility for the
entire spacecraft system with no requirements for NASA to act as the coordinator of
multiple contractors. It places the full burden of systems management on the Prime
System Contractor. However, it is not a practical contracting method because of the
disparity in development and fabrication c3cles between spacecraft and instruments. In
view of the long lead time required for instrument development, this method of contracting
would necessitate selecting the prime system contractor before he would be needed to begin
spacecraft development undoubtedly at an increase in cost of the total program.
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METHOD 2 - Multiple Prime Contractors
In this method, NASA would go to the other end of the scale and contract separately for
the major program segments such as is depicted in Figure 4-3. In this approach the
interface between NASA and Industry is greatly expanded since NASA is now responsible
for the integration of four or more contractors. It is easy to see that the degree of
control required to keep these contractors in technical and schedule consonance is
heightened as would be the interface coordination between all system segments. This
method is very undesirable since it obviously tends to increase program control require-
ments, expends the interface points, and makes more difficult NASA's directive
responsibility. It promises to be quite unwieldly and appears to proliferate costs.
NASA
GENERAL PURPOSE MISSION UNIQUE
S/C S/C SEGMENTS
Figure 4-3
METHOD 3 - Prime and Associate Contractors
This method is a minor adaptation of the current practice of a spacecraft system contractor
and a number of instrument contractors wherein NASA retains responsibility for instrument
development and fabrication and for coordinating the interface between the spacecraft
system contractor and the instrument contractors. The difference being recommended is
that at the earliest practical date, NASA delegates technical direction of the instrument
contractors to the spacecraft system contractor. This, as shown in Figure 4-4, would
decrease the technical coordination of day-to-day activities between the contractors but
would allow NASA to retain contractual direction of all contractors.
Method 3 offers many advantages over other contracting methods because it
o enables GSFC to trade cost, schedule and performance between the
instruments and the spacecraft system,
o utilizes NASA's on-board expertise to fullest advantage in instrument
development,
o reduces the NASA-S/C contractor - instrument contractor interfaces,
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o provides effective contractual control over the minimum required number
of contractors,
o allows initiation of firm instrument development contracts before initiation
of prime system contract as required by development cycles.
NASA DIRECTION
CONTRACTUAL
PRIME INSTRU MENT
SYSTEM CONTRACT DIRECTION > ASSOCIATE
SYSTEM CONTRACT CONTRACTORS
S/C-INST
INTEGRATION
Figure 4-5
4.3.3 CONTRACT STRUCTURE
4. 3. 3. 1 Type Contract
The next consideration was to determine the most appropriate type of contract for the
total program. As an aid in the evaluation, Table 4-7 Analysis of Contract Types
vs. Requirements was derived. Of the four types of contracts analyzed, it was determined
that no single type of contract meets the total objectives of a development/production
program.
The rationale leading to this conclusion is as follows:
Fixed Price. Fixed Price contracts are applicable to any contract wherein the work to be
performed and products to be delivered are sufficiently well defined to allow for accurate
costing. Fixed Price contracts place the greatest risk on the contractor. The lack of effort
and product specifity which makes pricing nebulous causes a contractor to include "safety
factor" costs in his pricing to balance the risk he incurs. This is not conducive to low cost
pricing.
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Figure 4-7. Contract Types vs. Requirements
b Requirements Pf I e
For Types of 0 n 0
. Firm Fixed Price Std. Comm. Fixed Fixed None None Fixed Any Fixed Fixed Yes Excellent Known None None
or Modi- Expected
,i: fled Item
Fixed Price/ Std. Comm. Fixed Fixed None None Fixed Any Fixed Fixed Yes Excellent Few Few May None
Escalation or Modi- Expected Conting. Exist
fled Item
Fixed Price Complex Very Very Very Very Few Very Any Very Firm Good Pre- Good Good Very Few Very Few
Incentive Item Good Good Few Expected Good ferred
(Firm Target)
Fixed Price Complex Reason- Reason- Uncertain Some Uncertain Long Uncertain Uncertain Not Good Uncertain Some Minimum
Incentive Item ably ably Initially Changes Initially Initially Becomes Neces- Initially Progress
(Successive Tight Tight Becomes Expected Becomes Becomes Firm sary Becomes Elimin-
1>3 Targets) Firm Initially Firm Firm Later Firm ated
Prospective Price Complex Firm Firm Firm Some Firm Very Firm Firm Not Good Reason- Few Minimum
Redetermination Item Outset- Expected Outset- Long Outset- Outset- Neces- Outset- ably
Changes Changes Changes Changes sary Changes Certain
W/Time W/Time W/Time W/Time W/Time
Retroactive Price Where Cost Not Firm Not Firm Few Few Not Firm Short Not Firm Not Firm Not Fairly Reason- Few Some
Redetermination Type Neces- Good ably
Normally sary Certain
Used
Cost Plus Complex Adequate Adequate Many Many Not Firm Long Reason- Adequate Not Fairly Reason- Yes - Many
Incentive Fee Item For For able For Start Neces- Good ably Progres-
Start Start Knowledge Changes sary Detailed sively
Changes Changes Expected Elimin-
Expected Expected. ated
Cost Plus Complex Not Not Many Many Not Firm Any Not Firm Not Firm No Perhaps Little Yes Many
Fixed Fee Fixed Firm Poor Detail
Cost Reimbursement. This type of contract is suitable for use when uncertainties in per-
formance, design, etc. are of such magnitude that the cost of contract performance cannot
be estimated with sufficient reasonableness to permit use of the fixed price type contracts.
While this type of contract overcomes the problem of obtaining reliable pricing data, it tends
to be more costly than fixed price. This type of contract also places the greatest risk on
NASA and inherently allows incorporation of design features which do not contribute to pro-
gram objectives. This type of contract does not provide the contractor with the motivation
to meet NASA objectives of low cost, performance, and schedule.
Other Contract Types. Other contractual types such as redeterminables, time and material,
labor hours, were analyzed and considered to not offer potentials for a cost effective contract,
nor do they provide the contractor with the necessary prime drivers to exceed contract re-
quirements. They require greater surveillance and are more burdensome administratively.
The analysis of applicability of contract type to EOS-A therefore led to the conclusion that
(a) no single type contract serves the total program; (b) in developing a cost effective con-
tract, consideration must be given to NASA program objectives in conjunction with the three
system segments -- spacecraft, GDHS, and instruments; (c) the type of contract must have
the flexibility to meet the needs of the program as it evolves, and (d) a phased contract which
contains features of both fixed price and cost reimbursable type contracts, with incentive/
award fees should be considered.
4.3.3.2 Phased Contracts
Further analysis of the applicability of contract types solidified the conclusion that the
prime contract for the spacecraft system should be in two phases, the development phase
and the manufacturing phase. This allows for the application of a cost plus contract for
the development phase and a fixed price for the manufacturing phase each being most
appropriate for the effort to be performed in those respective phases. This approach
also provides a proper contract structure for a design to cost technique as discussed in
Section 4. 8.
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4. 3.3.3 Incentive/Award Structure
Fee is the principle method for motivating the contractor to meet NASA's objectives,
emphasizing low cost, performance, and schedule.
Various types of contract fees were considered (Table 1); however, the analysis was
confined to three types for the Phase I contract and two for Phase II contract. The
purpose of the matrix (Table 2) was to determine the type of contract fee which would
best motivate the Contractor to perform as the program progresses. A numberic value
was assigned on the basis of desirability from NASA's viewpoint, with 1 being the most
desirable and 3 the least desirable.
Table 4-8. Program Objectives Related to Contract Structure
PHASE I PHASE II
CPFF CPIF CPAF FP FPI
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Quality 2 1 1 2 1
COST CONTROL
Direct Cost 3 1 2 1 1
Indirect Cost 3 1 2 1 1
Funding Work Arounds 3 2 1 1 2
SCHEDULE
Hardware 3 1 2 2 1
Software 3 1 2 2 1
Reports - Technical 2 2 1 2 2
- Managerial 2 1 1 2 1
Less obvious, but important, concerns to the performance of any program and the type of
contract structure which would best motivate the contractor and provide a basis for control
by the Government were also analyzed although it is difficult to attribute to them direct
cost savings. (Table 4-9)
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Table 4-9. Program Objectives Related to Contract Structure
PHASE I PHASE II
CPFF CPIF CPAF FP FPI
OTHER
Technical Direction 1 2 1 1 2
High Level Management Support 3 2 1 1 1
Management Response to Solving
Total System Problems 2 1 1 1 1
Fast Responsive Communications 3 2 1 3 2
Cooperation with Other Associates 3 2 1 3 2
Subcontract Management Integration
and Control 2 1 1 1 1
Accuracy of Reporting 2 1 1 1 1
Cost of Change Negotiations 1 2 1 2 2
It was concluded that a combination of incentives and awards contract structure would
be most appropriate for the cost plus development of the EOS Program. The strongest
motivation on any contractor is to tie significant profit incentives to overall performance,
costs control and schedule. Therefore, the following should be considered:
TZpe Incentive/Award Schedule
Award Based On o Management Performance
o Degree of Program Integration
o Innovative (Low Cost) Changes
Incentives o Cost
o Schedule
o System Performance
Minimum Fee o Stipulated - To Cover Cost Disallowances
It is also proposed an award be paid at the conclusion of the program. This award should
be primarily for the business management and technical performance on the program.
This award would provide a means for adjusting the final award so that the incentives will
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be consistent with the contractor's final performance. This award would cover intangible
items such as:
.o Control of Major Subcontractors
o Quality of Technical Performance (PDR, CDR, Integ. and Test)
o Response to Solving Total System Problems
o Superior Output
o Work Around Funding Limitations
o Management Responses
o Failure Correction
The incentive and award combination should be structured so that heavy emphasis can be
placed on both cost and performance and in addition, provide for a method to measure
management responsiveness.
Performance incentives, while emphasizing performance of contractor supplied hardware,
should also emphasize total system results, thereby motivating the contractor to perform
in a manner designed to assure complete system success. Subcontractors (where appro-
priate) should also share in the incentive so that all are working together as a team.
4.3.3 FIXED PRICE SUCCESSIVE TARGET INCENTIVES
In the analysis, the successive target concept was found to be a most appropriate
ingredient for obtaining a cost effective type contract for the Manufacturing phase of the
EOS Program.
Under this type of contracting, there is negotiated at the outset of the program:
1. An initial target cost
2. An initial target profit
3. A ceiling price
4. A formula for fixing the firm target profit
5. A production point when the formula applies. The formula is used only
to fix the firm target price.
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When the production point is reached for applying the formula (for example, delivery of
the prototype unit during development phase), the firm target cost is negotiated and the
firm target profit is automatically determined in accordance with the formula.
This type of contracting is most appropriate because it requires the contractor to be
realistic and objective in his initial approach to the total program and it provides for the
gneration of sufficiently reliable cost and pricing data early during development Phase I
to permit meaningul negotiation of realistic firm contract targets for the manufacturing
phase. This type of contracting requires the contractor to initiate low cost features early
in the development program and restrains NASA and the contractor from implementing
"nice to have features" which contribute nothing to program objectives.
4.3.4 RECOMMENDED APPROACH
In developing a contracting arrangement for the total EOS Program, the study has led
to a concept which will be not only cost effective but also will satisfy NASA needs.
Therefore, the following recommendations are made:
1. That NASA award a contract to a prime system contractor who will be
responsible for the design, development, manufacture and test of the
spacecraft and the ground handling data system and for integration of
the instruments into the spacecraft.
2. That NASA also award contracts to the payload contractors who then become
associate contractors at the appropriate point in time and thereafter take
technical direction from the prime system contractor and contractual
direction from NASA.
3. That the prime system contract be structured into two phases consisting
of the following:
Phase I - CPIF/AF for the development and manufacture of a prototype
spacecraft and for the design of the ground data handling data system.
That the contract be so structured to motivate (through incentive and
award features) the contractor to fulfill NASA objectives. Candidates
for the incentive/award features to include schedule, cost, management
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responsiveness, engineering quality, innovative low cost changes, and prototype
acceptance criteria.
Phase II - Fixed Price Successive Target Incentive for the manufacture of the
spacecraft, integration and test of total observatory system and the manufacture
of the ground handling data system. The incentive candidates to be schedule,
cost and flight performance.
The approach recommended is considered to be the most cost effective because:
o it provides the flexibility of sharing the risk between NASA and the
contractor. Both parties working toward a common goal
o it places a ceiling on the contract price
o incentive features motivate the contractor to meet NASA objectives of low
cost, performance, and delivery
o the successive target features require the contractor to be innovative
during the development phase
o cost information and basis for sound estimates become available
during the development phase so that both parties can negotiate
realistic costs
o it obligates the contractor to a price for the production phase prior to the
beginning of the production phase
o it places emphasis on the contractor and NASA to implement changes
prior to PDR and no later than CDR
o it places parameters on the contractor during the development phase
o it contributes to "designing right the first time"
o it initiates safeguards against the "this would be nice to have or let's play
it safe and throw in an extra measure for performance" syndrome
o it reduces the long established tendency to demand features pressing the
state-of-the-art and over-sophistication during the early cycle of the program
o it precludes unnecessary elements from creeping into the final design.
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4.4 SUBCONTRACTING TECHNIQUES
The analysis of the subcontracting techniques is redundant to the contracting techniques
contained in Section 4.3. For this reason, it is not repeated in this section. It is
standard practice, and properly so, to prepare all subcontracts in the image of the prime
contract because the responsibilities which the prime contractor assumes cannot be
properly assumed unless these identical responsibilities are placed on the subcontractors.
The application of method and type of contracts for subcontracts is identical to that of
prime contracts discussed in Section 4.3.
4.5 TEST PHILOSOPHY
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION
The unique aspects of the EOS design approach have been thoroughly studied and compared
to programs now in progress or recently completed. This study led to a viable test
philosophy and program that could be effectively implemented in two steps. The first
step step moves from the present approach to the EOS-A program and the second step
carries the cost reduction techniques even further for additional savings in the follow-up
spacecraft test programs.
Prime considerations were given to the effects of multiple missions utilizing identical
spacecraft bus hardware, fully modular design, on-orbit repair by replacing subsystem
modules, on-board computer utilization for test and troubleshooting, and reducing the
effort expended on various spacecraft models as the overall program progresses through
several spacecraft.
Figure 4-5 shows a summary test flow of the various approaches considered in the
study and Table 4-10 shows the degree of tests performed in each area, including
spacecraft models considered for each test program.
Cost estimates were then made for the three types of test programs. A summary of these
costs are provided in Table 4-11. This clearly shows the net reduction in total costs
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Table 4-10. Test Program
Typical S/C EOS-A Follow-on EOS
S/C Models
Thermal Yes No No
SDM Yes Yes As Required
Antenna Yes As Required As Required
Harness M/U Yes Yes As Required
Component
Qualification
Elec. Perf. Yes Yes No
Mechanical Yes Partial No
Environmental Yes Partial No
Flight
Elec. Perf. Yes Yes** Yes
Mechanical Yes Partial Partial
Environmental Yes Partial Partial
Subsystem or Module
Qualification
Elec. Perf. No Yes No
Mechanical No Yes No
Environmental No Yes No
Flight
Elec. Perf. Yes No* Yes
Mechanical No No* Yes
Environmental No No* Yes
System
BIT No Yes As Required
Prototype S/C Yes No No
Proto-Flight
Elec. Perf. No Yes No
Mechanical No Yes No
Environmental No Yes No
Flight
Elec. Perf. Yes No* Yes
Mechanical Yes No* Yes
Environmental Yes No* No
* Qual unit(s)/Subsystem(s) used for flight
** Additional unit(s) needed where qual units not available
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as the program progresses. This is primarily achieved by the reduction of required test
models and the reduction of large test crews reauired for long, full system level test
programs.
Table 4-11. Estimated Test Costs
PRESENT EOS-A FOLLOW-ON EOS
S/C Models 980K (24%) 510K (19%) 180K (15%)
Component 920K (23%) 430K (16%) 430K (35%)
Subsystem or Module 72K( 2%) 144K ( 5%) 144K (12%)
System 2100K (51%) 1550K (60%) 460K (38%)
Totals 4072K 2634K 1214K
1) -1438K -1- 1420K-
K -) 2858K
Development tests are unique to each program and would be included in the non-
recurring costs of each program; therefore, a discussion of purely development test
programs would be subjective and would not provide a meaningful trade-off. In line
with this, development testing involving breadboards, brassboards, etc. is not
discussed further in this write-up.
4.5.2 PRESENT TEST PHILOSOPHY
The present test program approach has evolved over the years and has been modified as
a function of the life requirements for the particular programs. To achieve on-orbit
performance for long life spacecraft, it was necessary to provide redundancy for
mission critical components and/or subsystems and to provide extensive test programs
to assure that all alternate operational modes are thoroughly checked out and trouble free
prior to launch. One of the predominant features of the present philosophy is the extensive
environmental tests performed from the component level through the subsystem and
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system level. This level of tests is time consuming and often requires large test crews
to maintain around-the-clock tests.
Figure 4-5 illustrates the test flow for a typical long life spacecraft. In this approach,
an Engineering or Prototype Spacecraft is fabricated and fully tested to assure that the
various subsystem interfaces are correct, and that the various operational modes,
operational software packages and the ground system are integrated into an operational
system. Following this, the flight system is fabricated and checked out through various
levels of tests prior to launch. This has been a successful test program for achieving
long life spacecraft to date, but is not deemed necessary in the shuttle era.
4.5.2. 1 Qualification
Based upon results of the development testing, prototypes of components and systems are
then fabricated. This hardware is then subjected to a full prototype environmental test
program at the component levels. After completion of the component qualification tests,
the units are assembled in a prototype spacecraft and subjected to additional qualification
tests at the systems level. The test program is very extensive including electrical
performance at prescribed milestones, RF testing, vibration testing, acceleration
testing, thermal-vacuum and sometimes thermal balance. If acoustics is a significant
problem, acoustic testing is also performed.
The prototype spacecraft is then placed in storage or maintained as a test bed for future
troubleshooting modes. While the prototype does provide a useful function, it is an
expensive approach requiring a complete spacecraft.
4.5.2.2 Acceptance
Flight hardware normally is subjected to performance and environmental testing at
the component and system levels. This program, although at lower environmental
levels than for the prototypes, covers the same test at different levels and for
different test durations. As shown in Figure 4-5 and Table 4-10 the components
are submitted to full acceptance tests then assembled into the spacecraft and subjected
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to additional acceptance tests at the Spacecraft level. The penalty for this concept is
time and dollars, the latter being quite significant as shown in Table 4-11.
4. 5. 2. 3 Spacecraft Models
The typical spacecraft design also includes the fabrication and test of various models to
assure that the fundamental designs are sound. Each of these models plays an important
role in the development of a new spacecraft, but the role becomes less and less significant
as additional spacecraft of similar designs are provided.
Thermal Model. Thermal models are provided to confirm the adequacy of the thermal
design of a spacecraft. As the spacecraft design develops, a thermal analytical model
of the spacecraft is also developed. From these a model is fabricated incorporating
"like prime" structure and actual or simulated thermal components are mounted in the
structure. The model is then subjected to the prescribed thermal environments. If
deviations occur, then corrective design measures are incorporated and the analytical
model is updated accordingly. Thus, the final design is approached in an iterative
manner. Computer programs have been developed to perform this complex analysis and
can be readily modified to incorporate the changes as required.
Structural Dynamics Model (SDM). The structural development model consists of a full
scape primary and secondary structure of the spacecraft including mass models of all
major components or assemblies, installed in their respective flight configuration. The
SDM is utilized to: confirm dynamic analytical models; demonstrate the structural
integrity of the design for qualification; confirm the dynamic internal environments for
subsystems and components; confirm the dynamic envelope within the fairing; confirm
separation clearances; confirm partial spacecraft and mechanical AGE/support equipment
compatibility and to develop dynamic environment test techniques for the Flight Vehicle.
Testing includes launch and orbital vibrations, static load tests or steady state accelera-
tion and shock as necessary to achieve the test objectives.
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Antenna Model. Antenna model spacecraft are normally provided on new designs. These
models are checked out on antenna ranges to assure that the gain and patterns are con-
sistent with the design requirements. Normally, these are made of material that provides
the RF characteristics of the spacecraft. However, they do not require prime type
material in most areas.
Harness Mock-Up. A harness mock-up is used as a development tool and is made to
prime dimensions. Mock-up harnesses are then assembled in place until the placement
of all harness segments is completed. These segments are then removed and three
dimensional boards made up from the mock-up harnesses. All flight harnesses are then
fabricated in the proper configuration on these boards. This is an extremely useful model
as it eliminates the extensive handling required to mount prime harnesses in the proper
configuration.
4.5.3 RECOMMENDED EOS TEST PHILOSOPHY
The modular approach to the spacecraft design provides for a logical reduction in system
level tests and system level models. As shown in Figure 4-5 and Table 4-11 a
significant reduction is achieved in test and test cost as the transition is made from the
typical spacecraft to EOS-A and then to the Follow-On EOS programs. This new
philosophy is based on the concept of investing development funds in the initial phases of
a program and relying (rather than retesting) on the results throughout the program. This
concept is also consistent with successful commercial test programs.
4. 5.3. 1 EOS-A Test Philosophy
The EOS-A test philosophy is based on combining flight proven/qualified hardware with
the new modular design approach of the EOS system. Therefore, some of the old concepts
will be integrated with the new test approach to assure meeting the orbital life require-
ments of the spacecraft. In this approach one prime spacecraft will be fabricated and
processed through a combination of prototype and flight environments.
4-39
4.5.3.1.1 Spacecraft Models
An SDM and Harness Mock-Up will be fabricated and utilized as described in Section
4.5.2.3 and maintained for use on the follow-on EOS spacecraft. An Antenna Model
will be fabricated as required based on the final configuration of the EOS-A spacecraft.
The modular design approach of the EOS spacecraft greatly simplifies the analytical
thermal model of the spacecraft. Since each module is thermally isolated from the
structure and the other subsystem modules, the analytical approach and computer
programs are relatively easy to perform. In addition, the history of previous programs
establishes the high degree of correlation between analysis, test data and on-orbit data.
Therefore, the spacecraft Thermal Model is not considered necessary for the EOS
Program.
4. 5. 3. 1. 2 Bench Integration Tests (BIT)
A Bench Integration Test program should be implemented on EOS-A in place of an
Engineering or Prototype Spacecraft. The basic configuration of this approach will
include all the Engineering components in the subsystem arrangements; however, the
components and test points are readily accessible for ease of integration. The inter-
connecting harnesses duplicate the wire size, number, shielding and connections of the
flight spacecraft harness so that conducted RF, voltage drops, etc. will be representative
of that found in the flight spacecraft.
This approach also provides an opportunity to integrate the spacecraft electrical
subsystem early in the program to provide an evaluation of system electrical and RF
compatibility. It also serves to checkout electrical test equipment compatibility,
test ground station operation, establish test procedures and checkout test software
sequences. Thus a large percentage of the results achieved in a prototype spacecraft
will be obtained in this configuration at a much lower cost.
The BIT Board should be maintained throughout the EOS program and used as a test
bed for new payloads or mission peculiar subsystems.
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4.5.3.1.3 Qualification Program
As in all new programs there will be some requirements that will necessitate new or
modified component designs. In addition, this will be the first spacecraft with the
modular design approach; therefore, it is deemed necessary to provide a higher degree
of testing on EOS-A than on the follow-on spacecraft.
An evaluation of both the EOS-A Configuration and the follow-on EOS Configuration was
made to determine feasible approaches to solving both problems with minimum test
and coast as a goal. Thus the qualification program shown in Table 4-10 was arrived at.
For new designs the components would be subjected to electrical performance tests,
workmanship vibration and a temperature cycle test. Upon successful completion of
these tests the components would be mounted within the respective subsystem module along
with the flight units that had passed similar tests.
Since EOS-A is not repairable in orbit and the subsystem modules are identical to those
used on the follow-on EOS spacecraft it was decided that the modules should be fully
qualified on EOS-A.
4.5.3. 1.4 Spacecraft Tests
As shown in Table 4-10, the EOS-A spacecraft is a proto-flight system. Proto-flight is
defined as testing the system to qualification levels for flight duration requirements.
Thus, the proto-flight test sequence provides both the flight qualification and acceptance
test functions. This will provide the basic systems level qualification tests for EOS-A
and the follow-on spacecraft. An additional advantage this spacecraft has over the
typical spacecraft, discussed in Section 4. 5. 2, is the incorporation of an On-Board
Computer. The Computer can be programmed to provide different sampling rates for
telemetry functions, monitor critical functions and flag an out-of-limits condition if or
when it occurs or provide command capability to modify the spacecraft operation in the
event of specific malfunctions, etc. Therefore, the OBC can be used as a useful
diagnostic tool, provide a means for modifying the system operation when specific
anomalies occur and aid in the overall test programs.
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4.5.3.2 Follow-On EOS Spacecraft Test Philosophy
The follow-on EOS spacecraft test philosophy is readily derived from the preceding
sections. Additional factors to be considered here are the on-orbit retrievable and
repair capability provided by the Shuttle. Thus a much reduced test program is realistic
and achievable.
4.5. 3.2. 1 Spacecraft Models
The necessary EOS spacecraft models are provided during the EOS-A phase of the
program. Those required to be retained and modified for the follow-on EOS spacecraft
are the SDM, Antenna Model, and the Harness Mock-Up. A significant reduction in
cost is achieved by this method as shown in Table 4-11.
4. 5. 3. 2. 2 Bench Integration Test (BIT)
The BIT Board described in Section 4. 5. 3. 1. 2 will be modified in accordance with new
and modified payloads and/or other mission peculiar subsystems. Again it is readily
seen that this is an area where significant cost savings can be achieved.
4. 5. 3. 2. 3 Qualification Program
All qualification level tests were performed on EOS-A. Therefore, no additional
qualification tests are anticipated for the follow-on EOS spacecraft.
4.5.3.2.4 Acceptance Test
Partial or complete acceptance tests will be performed at all levels. The components
will be subjected to a complete electrical performance test, workmanship vibration
test, and a thermal cycle test. Upon successful completion of these tests the units will
be mounted in the subsystem modules and a complete flight level acceptance test will be
performed.
After the modules successfully pass the acceptance test they will be placed on the
spacecraft for a full electrical performance test and a vibration test representative of
the flight loads.
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4.5.4 TEST IMPLEMENTATION
Test implementation techniques in the areas of procedures, data evaluation, ground
support equipment, ground station operation, test personnel and overall test requirements
have been examined and evaluated to determine optimum cost effective methods for
implementing the EOS test program
Procedures. Since spacecraft development and qualification will be implemented through
EOS-A, test procedures for this vehicle should be detailed in nature. All interfaces
should be minutely examined during integration and system procedures should be
slanted toward quantitative performance analysis. Testing should be designed to
produce maximum operating time on hardware consistent with component life limits and
mission requirements.
The effort for follow-on vehicles should be directed toward standardization and minimum
system testing. Since EOS should have a standard basic spacecraft for all missions, it
is completely consistant with reliability requirements to plan procedure effort to effect
the following economies:
a. Standard basic spacecraft integration procedures for all vehicles after
EOS-A.
b. Minimum spacecraft integration, possibly only assembly into the structure,
harness connection and brief functional check.
c. Computer controlled tests, utilizing the on-board computer for commanding
and limit checking of telemetry.
d. Only one system qualitative (go/no go) functional test to be utilized
throughout the program whenever a functional test is required.
Evaluation. In-depth evaluation will be necessary for EOS-A. This means extensive
manual analysis of spacecraft data, particularly for the basic spacecraft since it is
imperative that basic spacecraft reliability be established beyond question for this
vehicle. This technique thus lays the groundwork for reducing extensively the manual
evaluation required for follow-on vehicles for basic spacecraft testing. Once spacecraft
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performance parameters and reliability have been firmly established, barring significant
hardware changes, later evaluation can be readily relegated to automated computer
techniques. I is envisioned that limit-checking probably with the on-board computer will
provide the bulk of evaluation necessary for follow-on spacecraft performance. Backup
ground station computers should be available also to perform this function. Software,
generated during EOS-A qualification should be designed for use in either on-board
computer or ground station computer.
Ground Support Equipment. The concept of a universal assembly, test, handling and
transport fixture should be investigated and implemented to the greatest extent possible
for EOS. Such a fixture offers potential for significant savings in the following areas:
a. Once assembled in the fixture the spacecraft is not removed until ready
for mate to the launch vehicle, saving the time of numerous fixture
transfer moves during the program.
b. The cost of a single fixture versus the cost of multiple fixtures (i. e.,
assembly fixture, ambient test fixture, T/V fixture, transport dolly,
etc.) should be analyzed.
Electrical GSE should be minimized. Basically, it should provide essential powering
and monitoring facilities for controlling the spacecraft. Since system testing will be
minimized, special test equipment racks such as deployment console, RF console and
solar array simulator should not be required at the system level; however, equipment
requirements for testing at the module (subsystem) level will increase and the net
savings may well be zero.
Ground Station. Test ground station requirements for the basic spacecraft are not
expected to be significantly different than those presently in force. Although the OBC
should be used for spacecraft control and evaluation to the greatest extent possible,
backup capability must exist in the ground station to program and check the OBC, display
data output by the OBC and T/M link and to take over spacecraft control in event of
OBC malfunction. The greatest saving in the ground station area should be in the area
of manpower.
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It is expected that payload ground stations would be supplied with the instrument or
a type of the instrument output as required, and would be primarily of a go/no go
checkout design requiring minimal attention.
Personnel. One of the major cost drivers in a system test program is personnel.
Traditional programs encompassing detailed integration, multiple quantitative functional
tests, full environmental testing, mechanical and mass properties determinations and
prelaunch testing at the launch site require large dedicated test crews for upwards of
six to eight months per spacecraft. System test personnel requirements rise to one
hundred or more people for large tests, around the clock, such as thermal-vacuum.
For normal multiple shift testing (2 shifts/day, 5 days/week) requirements are will in
the 50-man range when all supporting functions such as procedures, evaluation, ground
station operations, repair and maintenance and logistics are considered.
EOS can greatly reduce these requirements by vastly curtailing system testing. The
elimination or reduction of acceptance environmental testing at the system level and
substitution of acceptance at the module level should not only reduce the length of the
system test program but also the number of people required for any given test. With
this concept, personnel can be reduced in the following areas:
o Standard general purpose spacecraft integration procedures should reduce
procedure writing from an average of three to one after procedures have
been finalized.
o Utilization of the OBC for checking spacecraft functions on an automated
basis without manual checking can reduce evaluation engineer requirements
from an average of two to one depending upon payload complexity.
o Simplification and automation of integration and system performance
procedures can reduce on-line test crews per shift from an average of
two to one.
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4.5.5 TEST PHILOSOPHY SUMMARY
To attain significant cost reductions in a spacecraft test program it is mandatory that
spacecraft level tests be kept to a minimum. These system tests produce the highest
overall costs because:
o Large, experienced crews are required for testing the spacecraft, manning
ground stations and evaluating performance.
o Test procedures and software are complex, requiring many man-hours
to produce and a continuing effort to update.
o The large environmental test facilities needed are expensive to operate
because they require multiple operators.
o Test installations are massive requiring considerable time to set up
and dismantle.
In order to realize the greatest cost effectiveness for the EOS test program, greater
emphasis must be placed on comprehensive environmental testing at the subsystem level,
while system testing is relegated to the role of "workmanship" and go/no go tests.
Since the EOS program will be a multiple vehicle program utilizing the same basic
subsystem modules and structure for each spacecraft, it is uniquely suited for such
an approach. The subsystem modular concept also lends itself to this philosophy.
Subsystem environmental testing at the module level can be made as fully stringent
and realistic as at the spacecraft level. Further, any subsequent module replacement
due to malfunction or failure during systems testing can be made with minimum impact
on the spacecraft test program because environmental testing has already taken place.
4.6 RELIABILITY & QUALITY ASSURANCE
4.6.1 RELIABILITY PROGRAM
Reliability program requirements for NASA programs are generally specified by
NHB 5300.4, entitled "Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space
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System Contractors", dated April 1970. The provisions of this document are applied
in totality, or by specific paragraphs only.
During the many years of implementation of the provisions of this document, it has been
found that certain of these tasks make a significant contribution to the removal of
unreliability from a space system whereas other tasks have little or no impact on the
hardware at all and can be eliminated with no risk to the program and with a consequent
cost saving.
Retained Tasks. Those tasks that contribute to the removal or identification of potentially
critical design areas are:
o Supplier Control
o Design Specs
o Prediction (tradeoff studies only)
o FMECA's
o Design Reviews
o Failure Reporting and Analysis
o Parts/Materials Program
o Testing
o Maintainability (when required)
These controls, analyses, reviews and programs become increasingly important on the
EOS program to reduce cost without unduly inducing additional risk.
Deleted Tasks. The peripheral tasks that do not effect the reliability of the hardware are:
System Reliability Prediction - The prediction technique is generally used to
determine the comparable reliability of two or more competing designs. It
has little utility as a misused prediction of system performance.
Formal Progress Reports - Informal reporting is recommended.
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Reliability Evaluation Plan - The sequence of tests to which equipment is subjected -
prototype, development, acceptance and qualification are well established by this
time and the formal assessment of reliability from the test results is seldom done.
Reliability Training - This task is currently not done because its purpose has
already been achieved, Reliability consciousness has been installed throughout
the aerospace industry.
Standardization of Design Practices - The existing standards and specifications
are well understood and utilized by the cognizant personnel. The design review
process inspects the design and process standards used on a program.
Reliability Inputs to Readiness Reports - The responsibility for this task is
usually vested in configuration management.
Reliability Evaluation Program Reviews - This task is seldom done on NASA
Programs.
Reliability Program Reviews - The design review process replaces this task
on most programs.
Reliability Assessment - See comments under Reliability Evaluation Plan. As
is evident, these tasks can be deleted because they have been little used on past
programs and their omission from the EOS program will institute some cost savings
with minimal program effect.
Proposed Program. A proposed Reliability Program Plan is shown in Table 4-12. The
proposed program responds only to the provisions of NHB 5300.4 which are considered
necessary to eliminate or alleviate the major and sometimes subtle failure modes from
the satellite system and deletes those previously submitted as having little program value.
The program considers not only the selected contractors tasks responsibilities, but
also recommends the inclusion of certain provisions in the NASA Statement of Work (SOW)
that can influence the NASA/Contractor interface and task responsibilities.
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One basic premise on which the plan was constructed was that the customer (NASA) would
assign a resident QC&R representative at the contractors facility with the authority for
decisions, approvals and problem resolution.
If this premise is not accepted, then the responsibilities delineated in the program for the
NASA rep will be carried out formally by the existing NASA/contractor interface.
Other cost effective items are interwoven into the plan and are asterisked whenever they
appear.
4.6.2 QUALITY PROGRAM
The basic Quality requirements for NASA programs are defined in Reliability and
Quality Assurance Publications NHB 5300.4 (IB), "Quality Program Provisions for
Aeronautical and Space System Contractors". Although it was published in 1969, the
provisions of this document still provide the ground rules for a well-rounded Quality
Program. Each of the defined tasks in NHB 5300.4 (1B) is q required element in
any space oriented program, however, certain modifications to these provisions will
result in a more cost-effective Quality Program.
In summary, the elimination of any tasks in their entirety is not recommended, but
modification of the following tasks is recommended:
1B103 Quality Program Documents
1B204 Quality Status Reporting
1B300 Technical Documents
1B302 Change Control
1B502 Procurements Documents
1B504 Government Source Inspection
1B801 Nonconformance Documentation
1B804 Material Review Board
1B806 Supplier Material Review Board
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NHB
5300.4
TASK TASK NO, RECOMMENDED NASA RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY
Reliability Program 1A104 Specify in the SOW: Contractor will:
Documents
(1) Minimal formal documents required (1) Provide all documentation at
only, except that the program
(2) Provide approval responsibility to manager has the option for
a resident QC&R NASA lower level documentation.
representative.
(2) NASA QC&R rep. to interface
*(3) Accept legible handwritten copies with the Deputy Program Manager
with a cover sheet approval form (DPM) to determine:
for signatures.
o Approval route for specific
(4) If any document is considered documents
essential for formal presentation
outside the NASA-contractor o Formal document release
interface - specify formal (typed) schedule
presentation.
o Informal document release
schedule
o Integration of off-the-shelf
documentation into subsystem
and system analyses and data output.
Reliability Program 1A201 (1) Delete requirements for peripheral (1) Contractor to respond to specific
Plan tasks which do not impact on hardware. SOW requirements but, in addition,
will recommend simplification
o System rel. prediction (1A302) or other cost savings methods
o Formal Progress Reports (1A203) that may be implemented during
o Rel. evaluation plan program.
o Standardization of design
practices (1A307) (2) Contractor to show role of NASA
o Reliability inputs to readiness QC&R rep, in reliability tasks
reports (1A404) in the responsive reliability
o Reliability evaluation program plan.
review (1A405)
o Reliability program reviews (3) Contractor to show the integration
(1A202-2) of the off-the-shelf hardware
o Reliability Training (1A204) documentation in the reliability
tasks.
(2) Retain those tasks that aid in
removing unreliability from system:
o Supplier control
o Design specifications
o Prediction (in tradeoffs only)
o FMECA's
o Design reviews
o Failure reporting & analysis
o Parts/materials program
o Testing
o Maintintainability
Modify these tasks in accord with information
in following paragraphs:
(3) Specify the role of the NASA QC&R
rep. in the reliability tasks as to:
o Responsibility o Decisions
o Approvals o Boards
o Reviews
(4) Specify requirements for and use of
OTS documents.
Reliability Program 1A202 (1) NASA to establish a resident QC&R Contractor to delegate DPM as focal
Control representative at contractor's plant point for QC&R NASA rep. to interface
for an overview of program. Rep. to with DPM on all reliability activities.
participate in selected program DPM to control reliability activities.
activities in order to expedite:
(1) joint NASA/contractor decisions;
(2) approval routes; (3) data and
out of scope work request; (4)
progress reporting; (5) design
C Reliability Program 1A202-2 Reviews to only be called by NASA rep. Informal reviews should be scheduled
Reviews when the informal interface is not for minimum interference with normal
providing visibility to rep. Reviews program activities by agreement
--- -- - -" ifs~~hoIuld be scheduled-as partdfs3tem - between-DPMndNASA rep.j - -- we--
design reviews.
Reliability Progress lA203 NASA QC&R rep. to implement progress Contractor to ensure all output
Reporting reports to NASA via TELECON in documents are directed to NASA
conjunction with DPM. rep. for information and completion
of scheduled milestones.
Supplier Control 1A205 (1) Specify the acceptability of (1) Contractor will implement three
previously prepared documentation levels of controls on vendors
from other programs as modified from maximum on new design
to meet EOS requirements, suppliers to minimum on OTS
suppliers.
(2) Specify that the imposition of a
reliability program is not
required on off-the-shelf equip-
ment suppliers if their equip-
ment has been successfully
demonstrated by space flight.
(3) Specify that the provisions of NHB
5300.4 imposed on the contractor
will also be imposed by the contractor
on vendors of new design equipments.
Reliability of GFP A206 (1) NASA to provide all experiment (1) Contractor/NASA to determine
hardware to the contractor as documentation requirements
Government Furnished Property. on GFP depending on its:
o Availability
o Currency
o Depth
Reliability Prediction 1A302 (1) Specify in the SOW the restriction (1) Contractor will do prediction only
of the prediction to design at the option of design engineering
configuration tradeoff studies manager. No prediction will be
only. required by subs.
(2) Contractor will hold subsystem
design engineer responsible for
maintaining optimum safety margins
on new hardware and subcontracted
hardware.
(3) Design margins on OTS equipment
will be reviewed for applicability
to EOS multiple mission environmental
ranges.
(4) Contractor will require predictions
and part application data forms on
the OTS hardware in the data
package obtained from the vendors
in order to review the stress limits
on previously used parts.
(5) Similar stress analysis on OTS
materials should also be provided.
Failure Mode Effects 1A303 (1) Specify FMECA at component level (1) Contractor to analyze as specified
and Criticality up, except where a critical single and alert design engr. manager
Analysis point failure exists, then a failure to SPF's for decision on follow-up
mode analysis may be required at analyses based on item 2 in
the option of the design engr. opposite column.
manager.
(2) Contractor to integrate off-the-shelf
equipment FMECA's into the
subsystem or system FMECA.
(3) Contractor will specify an FMECA
in the statement of work to subs, if
any.
(4) The contractor will require an FMECA
in the data package obtained from the
OTS vendors.
Maintainability 1A304 (1) Specify the use of maintainability (1) Contractor to determine:
as one of the design parameters in
subsystem modularization studies. o Storage conditions required
Provide the maximum ground storage for modularized subsystems.
period expected for the worst case
mission, o Maximum storage time
allowable before degradation
begins.
o Expected degradation of
equipment during long term
storage.
o Replacement or refurbishment
requirements after long term
storage.
o Replacement or refurbishment
required after x missions,
where x -1,2,3...n.
o Most efficient modularization
4 vs. maintenance requirements
by subsystem.
0o Limiting item list ftr long
term storage or for long
term operation.
Design Review Program 1A305 (1) Specify design reviews at system (1) Set up a policy on the design
Program level only, reviews applied to:
* (2) Utilize the final design review to o off-the-shelf equipment
confer or reject qaual. status to o off-the-shelf modified
components/subsystems. equipment
o new equipment
(3) Specify that the final design review
will only review changes occuring (2) Utilize informal reviews with
since last design review. a NASA QC&R Rep. as a
participant into examine
(4) Utilize initial design review to component/subsystems.
determine where any special
testing should be concentrated. (3) Include maintainability and
storage on the agenda.
(4) Prior to final design review
publish a tabulation of
design or other changes
occurring since the last
review.
Problem, Failure 1A306 Part of Quality Plan
Correction
Parts, Devices & 1A308 Part of Quality Plan
Materials Program
wZ Table 4-12. Proposed Reliability Program Provisions (Based on NHB 5300.4 (lA))
The modifications recommended in each of these areas is discussed in detail in the
following paragraphs.
Paragraph 1B103 In addition to the Approval, Review, and Information
Quality Program
Requirements actions shown, additional category, "Retain in Contractor's
File", should be added to the list. Many of the documents
shown in Appendix A are not required by NASA to perform
their day-to-day duties. It would be cheaper and more
efficient to retain them at the Contractor's plant in a
file subject to review by NASA.
Paragraph Document Recommended Action
1B202-1 Training Document Retain in Contractor Files
1B202-4 Training and Certification Retain in Contractor Files
Records
1B203 Quality Information Retain in Contractor Files
1B204 Quality Status Report Information Copy - as portion
of Program Report
1B205-3 Quality Program Audit Reports Retain in Contractor Files
1B206 Quality Program Plan Approval Copy
1B206-2b Policies and Procedures Retain in Contractor Files
1B300 Technical Documents Retain in Contractor Files
1B300-2 Document Review Retain in Contractor Files
1B302 Change Control Systems Approval Copy - Systems Specifi-
Document cation, Contract and Statement
of Work Changes.
1B404 Identification List Retain in Contractor Files
1B501-1 Quality Records Retain in Contractor Files
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Paragraph Document Recommended Action
1B501-2 ire-Award Survey Results Retain in Contractor Files
1B502 Procurement Documents Retain in Contractor Files
1B506 Receiving Records Retain in Contractor Files
1B508-1 Post-Award Survey Schedules Retain in Contractor Files
1B508-1 Post-Award Survey Results Retain in Contractor Files
1B600 Fabrication Documents Retain in Contractor Files
1B603-2 Process Control Procedures Retain in Contractor Files
1B603-3 Equipment Certification Retain in Contractor Files
Records
1B604 Workmanship Standards Retain in Contractor Files
1B701 Inspection and Test Planning Retain in Contractor Files
1B702 Test Specifications Retain in Contractor Files
1B703 Inspection and Test Retain in Contractor Files
Procedures
1B704 End-Item Inspection and Test Retain in Contractor Files
Specifications and Procedures
1B705-7 End-Item Inspection and Test Retain in Contractor Files
Report
1B706-1 Inspection and Test Records Retain in Contractor Files
and DPta
1B706-2 Equipment Records Retain in Contractor Files
1B801 Nonconformance Documentation Review Copy - functional problems
during Subsystem or System level
testing.
Information Copy - functional
problems of component level
of test.
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Paragraph Document Recommended Action
Retain in Contractor Files -
all other anomalies and
discrepancies.
1B900 Procedures for Measurement Retain in Contractor Files
processes
1B902-3 Results of Evaluations Retain in Contractor Files
1B905-7 Calibration Records Retain in Contractor Files
1B1000 Stamp Control Procedures Retain in Contractor Files
1B1100-1 Handling Instructions Retain in Contractor Files
1B1100-2 Storage Procedures Retain in Contractor Files
1B1101-3 Packaging Procedures and Retain in Contractor Files
Instructions
1B 1102-2 Documentation Package Information Copy - accompany
shipment
1B1200 Sampling Plans Retain in Contractor Files
1B1300-4 Government Property Records Retain in Contractor Files
Paragraph 1B204 A separate Quality Status Report would duplicate much
Quality StatusReorlity t of the information included in the Program StatusReporting
Report. It is recommended that the Quality activities
should be included as an integral portion of the Program
Report.
Paragraph 1B300 A major cost driver in the Configuration Management
Technical Documents
and area is the requirement for customer approval of lower
Paragraph 1B302 tier documents and changes thereto. NASA absorbs the
Change ControlChan   high cost impact of this requirement by virtue of the need
to assign people to review the documents, raise questions,
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negotiate, and approve. The contractor suffers schedule
delays during this period and his cost goes up accordingly.
To minimize these costs on the EOS Program, it is
recommended that a minimum list of documents requiring
customer approval be drawn up. The list would be
restricted to the Contract, System Specification, and
Statement of Work. Lower tier documents, such as
acceptance test procedures or component specifications,
should not require customer approval. It is axiomatic that
approval authority for a document does hand-in-hand with
change control authority. Thus, changes to these lower
tier documents would not require customer approvals
unless the change affects the System Specification, Statement
of Work or the Contract.
Paragraph 1B502 Current NASA space programs include the provision for
Procurement Documentsand Government Source Inspection (GSI) imposed upon the
Paragraph 1B504 spacecraft prime contractor and his subcontractors and
Government Source
Inspection suppliers. This requirements includes the provision for
a resident government imspector to perform mandatory
inspections on the hardware, witness of test, optional
or random Product Quality Monitoring activities, and
other quality oriented activities. Cost and schedule savings
can be achieved on the EOS Program by a reduction in the
extent of this source inspection activity, without a concurrent
reduction in hardware quality.
Reduction in the GSI inspection and test monitoring function
would eliminate the potential multiple inspection coverage
at subcontractors and suppliers' plant, where the work is
inspected and tests are witnessed by the subcontractor
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or supplier, by the prime contractor source inspector,
and also by the government source inspector. In addition,
the possibilities for schedule slips and cost increases
resulting from the source inspector not being available
when needed would be reduced. The in-series mandatory
inspections, performed after the inspection function has
been completed by the contractor or supplier, and the test
monitoring by the government source inspector should be
changed. Instead, the Government source inspector or the
NASA Quality Monitor would perform an initial evaluation or
survey of the contractor's capability at the beginning of the
program. Then he would perform audits of quality activities,
rather than full time in-series mandatory inspections and
test witnessing.
This reduction in government source inspection on
scientific applications spacecraft programs would be
appropriate for several reasons:
o The usual concept of GSI is more applicable to
high volume production orders. For limited pro-
duction programs there is little opportunity for
the government inspector to become familiar with
the program requirements and the hardware to be
built for that program, especially for subcontracted
items.
o GSI at facilities of small contractors has not been
effective because in many cases the inspector has
had to split his time between several remote
facilities, or between several different programs.
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As a result, communications and understanding of
program requirements, and the ability of the
inspector to keep up to date on day-to-day activities
has been difficult. In these circumstances, it is often
difficult to get the inspector rapidly when he is needed
to perform his mandatory activities, resulting in
schedule delays to the hardware in process.
o The government/industry relationship has matured to
the point where the Prime Contractor, with ultimate
responsibility to ensure hardware quality, is allowed
to establish the system to assure that product quality
is achieved.
Paragraph 1B801 The requirements for formal Nonconformance Reporting at
Nonconformance all levels of inspection and test results in an expensive
Documentation
operating system. The resultant large amount of in-process
information masks the more significant acceptance test
problems, and the formal handling, resolution, and
dispositioning procedure can result in significant delays.
It is generally believed that an informal method of reporting
and handling in-process problems would eliminate these
disadvantages and result in reduced costs without reducing the
hardware/system quality or reliability. This informal
system would be used to handle problems that occur before
the initiation of acceptance testing on flight units or quali-
fication testing on prototype units, process fall-out within
acceptable limits, structure problems, and harness problems
other than those that occur during electrical testing on the
Spacecraft. The information on these problems would be
entered in a logbook or working file. It would be the
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responsibility of the cognizant engineers to analyze these
problems, establish both the disposition and corrective
action to be taken, and coordinate this activity with other
interested personnel. The information on both the problems
and resultant actions taken would be retained on file for
future reference and analysis. It is recommended that the
EOS Program requirements allow an informal system of
this nature to supplement the formal system of reporting
more significant individual problems.
Paragraph 1B804 The Contractor Material Review Board on the EOS Program
Material Review Board should not require a Government representative for the
disposition of Class II anomalies (variations). The
imposition of the Government representative on the
Contractor MRB should be limited to Class I anomalies
(deviations) that could have some adverse effect upon the
Spacecraft mission. This change would result in a direct
saving to NASA by reducing the government workload and
an indirect saving through the increased efficiency of
effort that could be applied to the disposition and correction
of the deviations. In addition, the Contractor could handle
the variations more efficiently and expeditiously without
affecting the overall EOS Program quality or reliability.
Paragraph 1B806 This paragraph should be amended to allow the Contractor
Supplier Material
eview Board to delegate Class II Material Review Board responsibility
to suppliers without NASA approval of each such delegation.
Industry's experience with suppliers and major subcontractors
has enabled it to adequately judge the ability of each company
to perform these activities.
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4.7 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION
A high portion of the cost of data management for a spacecraft system is the cost of
documentation delivered to the customer. Frequently the CDRL list provides for sub-
mission of data because the data exists in the contractor's facility and it would be "nice
to have".
The "business as usual" CDRL has been reviewed with the following thoughts in mind to
reduce the EOS CDRL to those documents which are necessary and sufficient for NASA
management of the EOS Program.
o Availability of information at the contractor's facility for customer perusal
rather than required submission.
o Maximum combination of reports to reduce redundant efforts.
o Use of contractor internal documentation whenever possible.
o Use of multi-detail drawings.
o Use of red-line and/or preliminary drawings in development phase.
o Use of existing NASA approved documents applicable to EOS.
o Reduce depth and frequency of financial and progress reports.
o Maximize exception reporting to minimize cyclic reports.
o Reduce number of copies submitted to essentials.
With the implementation of the above considerations, a sizable cost reduction can be
made. GE has developed a recommended EOS CDRL, as shown in Table 4-13, which
consists of 41 items. This was developed by deleting items from the extensive 211 item
CDRL of a previous NASA/GE program.
4.8 DESIGN-TO-COST
The greatest single difference between a spacecraft and commercial products development
and fabrication program is relative unit cost (granted that such a comparative cost is
difficult at best to achieve). That this difference exists is not surprising considering that
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Table 4-13. Recommended CDRL For EOS-A
1. Configuration Criteria Document Once
2. Mass Properties Status Once
3. Interface Definition Document Once
4. Configured Article List Once
5. New Technology Report Annual
6. Program Schedule and Status Report Bi-Monthly
7. EOS Safety Plan Once
8. Financial Report Quarterly
9. Data User's Handbook Once
10. Contract Work Breakdwon Structure Once
11. Electrical System Schematic Once
12. Spacecraft Integration and Test Procedures Once
and Requirements
13. Pre-Launch Procedures and Requirements Once
14. AGE Procedures and Checkout Requirements Once
15. General Purpose S/C Integration and Once
Test Requirements
16. Data Processing Subsystem Integration Once
Procedures
i7. Bench Integration Test Procedures Once
and Requirements
18. Thermal Control Requirements Once
19. Observatory Acceptance Test Reports Elect. Sys. T/V
After Launch
20. Data Processing S/S Integration Test Report Once
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Table 4-13. Recommended CDRL For EOS-A
(Continued)
21. Reliability Program Plan Once
22. Quality Assurance Program Plan Once
23. Malfunction Reports As Required
24. Failure Analysis Reports As Required
25. Material Inspection and Receiving Report At Delivery
26. Shuttle Compatibility Plan Once
27. S/C Autonomy Plan Once
28. S/C System Specifications Once
29, Basic Software Specifications Once
30. Interface Specifications Once
31. Thematic Mapper Specifications Once
32. HRPI Specifications Once
33. Attitude Control S/S Specifications Once
34. Power S/S Specifications Once
35. Communication and Data Handling Once
Specifications
36. Data Collection System Specifications Once
37. Mission/Systems Specifications Once
38. Ground Systems Specifications Once
39. Initial Activation Document Once
40. Flight Evaluation Report After Launch Quarterly
41. Type III Final Report On Vehicle Delivery
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in the Aerospace industry, performance comes first with cost second; whereas performance
is secondary to cost for a commercial product. The method of keeping the cost low in
commercial enterprises is "Design-To-Cost" which is an iterative process whereby
hardware and services are provided within the total cost constraints established by the
customer or market. In the simplest sense, the price which the market or consumer is
willing to pay for the product dictates what the selling price will be. Performance,
reliability, and quality are traded down to meet the cost goal. The process is actively
applied throughout the conceptual design, tooling, procurement, production phases of a
product cycle to provide a positive means of meeting overall product cost requirements.
This is accomplished by establishing a total project cost target, breaking down the total
target to lower level targets all the way to individual component parts, assigning
responsibility for meeting each cost target, monitoring performance throughout the design,
test, tooling, procurement, and production phases; identifying variances, and taking
corrective action. The process involves the identification of required functions and the
application of creative techniques to develop minimum cost means of providing those
functions. In this manner total cost becomes an input to the design process rather than a
result of it.
Historically, the Aerospace industry has not been asked to take a "commercial product"
approach to spacecraft design and fabrication. Rather, industry has been asked to
provide technologically advanced products of an extremely high reliability with cost very
subservient to performance to minimize the risk of failure. This was rightly so since once
launched the spacecraft is no longer accessible for repair or maintenance. The failure of a
commercial product merely means a trip to the repair shop of which there are none yet
in space.
With the advent of the space shuttle, perhaps spacecraft are now ready for a design to
cost approach since they will be accessible for repair, maintenance and return to the
shop.
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To apply design to cost in a spacecraft program like EOS appears feasible provided that
NASA plans a two-step procurement, a design to cost phase and an implementation phase.
During the design phase:
o Required performance envelopes are defined;
o Performance characteristics and levels which influence fabrication,
test, launch and operations costs are determined;
o Design configurations are costed on a life cycle basis; and
o Realistic cost goals are established as a function of performance.
Then as a result of the Design-To-Cost phase, the design implementation phase of the
contract is consumated at the cost goals established by NASA and Industry. This two-step
procurement is not unlike the practice of competitive design contract followed by a
production contract. What is new is that NASA and Industry would jointly select modifi-
cation of those performance parameters which can reasonably be accepted prior to and
during the shuttle era so as to minimize the spacecraft life cycle cost.
4.9 VALUE MANAGEMENT
The basic principles and techniques involved in "Value Management" were initially
developed by General Electric nearly thirty years ago, and have been very successfully
practiced by many companies all over the world. They involve the development of
creative, innovative thought. The principles have also been effectively practiced by a
number of government agencies for twenty years. The Department of Defense alone
has realized savings in the hundreds of millions of dollars in cost elimination during
this period of Value Improvement. Other agencies, such as the Department of
Transportation and the General Services Administration are currently employing contract
provisions for the effective management of Value by their contractors.
When specific low cost goals are established, the proper application of Value Management
techniques can generally enable the contractor to meet the goals, provided there is
timely authorization for the Value Engineering work, and provided that it is conducted
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by experienced, knowledgeable practioners, with full government cooperation and
assistance.
Most high technology programs are managed in an environment of "performance emphasis",
on a cost reimburseable basis that provides protection when overruns are encountered.
Priorities are generally assigned to elements of the program without challenging the
overall value of the element, or the value of the specific components of the element.
Consequently, costs tend to grow as "necessary" to the proliferation of requirements for
performance, reliability, schedule, and risk. As long as there are appropriations
sufficient to cover the costs, the relative importance of holding down costs is secondary
to these other program parameters.
The term "Low Cost" is often used to convey a basic desire that really includes other
factors. Naturally, no one wants low cost at the expense of the ability of the EOS to
effectively perform the needed functions with the necessary reliability. Moreover, no
one wants the low cost to justify increasingly high risk schedule slippage. The
interrelationship of these factors can be expressed as the VALUE of the EOS, where:
NEED x PERFORMANCE x RELIABILITYVALUE =
COST x RISK x SCHEDULE
In offering a Value technique for "Low Cost Management" therefore, an appropriate term,
based on the formula for value, is "Value Management". This section is addressed to a
method of assuring a lower cost program, without sacrificing any other necessary
characteristics, through a program of "Value Management" that will minimize the cost
without impairing the capability of the EOS to fulfill its mission.
Other cost trade studies of Value Management have indicated a significant reduction in
proposed program costs by initiating this technique as early as possible (even as early
as the RFP response). Therefore, based upon the contracting technique recommended
earlier (namely, phased contracts for the Prime Contractor) initiation of Value Management
in Phase I seems a natural for causing lower cost designs than might occur without the
application of this technique.
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Value management may be applied either by use of the "Program Clause" or the "Incentive
Clause".
The "Program Clause" provides for funding at a specified level for value investigations.
These "Program Clauses" generally are applicable to Design and Development contracts,
and they ensure that the Value Engineering work is indeed accomplished. They generally
provide for a modest (10% to 25%) sharing of savings with the contractor as an incentive.
Experience shows that the application of this "Program Clause", which institutes Value
Engineering in the design phase, has a greater cost savings than if Value Engineering
changes are made at a later phase of the program. In other words, it is less costly to
design it right the first time by Value Engineering techniques, than it is to retrofit.
The "Incentive Clause" authorizes the expenditure of contractor's funds (indirect) for
"Value Management". Incentive to perform takes the form of increased percentages of
"sharing" in the cost reductions identified and accepted by contract changes. The sharing
incentive can be, for example, 50% to the government, and 50% to the contractor,
depending on the type of contract. It can also be extended to subcontractors. It is
particularly appropriate in production contracts, where large multipliers exist with large
quantity, but it is also quite successful, when applied to development contracts, and to
single quantity projects as well.
For the EOS Program, it is recommended that NASA incorporate a "Program Clause"
for Value Management, providing for $100, 000 of specific effort. It is also recommended
that NASA contribute to the selection of the two to four studies to which this funding should
be allocated. It has been established that the early application of the technique will
provide the greatest cost saving impact on the program. If, for example, the twenty to
one return is realized on the EOS Program, it would not be unreasonable to identify
$2, 000, 000 for removal, where discrete courses of action are changed. If, however, the
Value Engineering is conducted at the very outset of a program, it will ideally provide
the direction needed before establishing any design to be changed.
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